In  Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc & Ors v Zhunus & Ors [2017] EWHC 3374 (Comm) Mr Justice Picken considered Section 2 of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. The judge held that he would have extended the limitation period on public policy and undue hardship grounds.  The judgment contains a review of the relevant case law and principles in relation to Section 2 of the 1984 Act.


Memorably described by Mr Robert Howe QC (leading Mr Jonathan Miller and Mr Daniel Saoul) as the ‘Star Wars’ defence, this, Mr Twigger submitted, makes it necessary to adopt a cautious approach which avoids viewing transactions carried out in Kazakhstan prior to 2010 in the same way as commerce is conducted in London in 2017. I bear this point in mind when considering the evidence in this case, together with Mr Howe’s inter-galactic inspired riposte (although whether acts before 2010 do properly qualify as “a long time ago” or whether Kazakhstan, or anywhere else, counts as “a galaxy far, far away” are not issues which, thankfully, I am required to resolve)”


The claimant brought a case alleging fraud. The relevant law was the law of Kazakhstan.  There was an issue as to whether the claims were statute barred under Kazakh law.  The judge found that there had been a fraud.



The Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984

547.          It is necessary, next, to consider the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984, specifically whether it would be appropriate in the present case to disapply the three-year limitation period contained in Article 180.1 of the KCC. In considering this matter, I do so on two hypothetical bases, each of which is contrary to the conclusions which I have arrived at concerning the ‘awareness’ issues: first, that the Claimants (whether through Mr Werner or SP Angel) had actual ‘awareness’ and, secondly, that they “should have become aware” for the purposes of Article 180.1.

548.          Section 1(1) of the 1984 Act provides:

“Subject to the following provisions of this Act, where in any action or proceedings in a court in England and Wales the law of any other country falls (in accordance with rules of private international law applicable by any such court) to be taken into account in the determination of any matter –

(a)   the law of that other country relating to limitation shall apply in respect of that matter for the purposes of the action or proceedings …; and

(b)   except where that matter falls within subsection (2) below, the law of England and Wales relating to limitation shall not so apply.”

Section 2 goes on to provide (in part) as follows:

“(1) In any case in which the application of section 1 above would to any extent conflict (whether under subsection (2) below or otherwise) with public policy, that section shall not apply to the extent that its application would so conflict.

(2) The application of section 1 above in relation to any action or proceedings shall conflict with public policy to the extent that its application would cause undue hardship to a person who is, or might be made, a party to the action or proceedings.”

549.          Mr Howe’s submission was that it would be appropriate in the present case to decide that the three-year limitation period contained in the KCC should not apply. He submitted that that limitation period conflicts with public policy for essentially two reasons. First, as he put it during the course of his oral closing submissions, “if Kazakhstan limitation law is framed in the way that the defendants would have it, so that it can start to run and apply and bar a claim before a claimant is in a position reasonably to have brought the claim”, then, this is contrary to public policy. He highlighted in this context, in particular, that it was Mr Arip’s and Ms Dikhanbayeva’s case (and Professor Sulemeinov’s evidence) that time would run for Kazakhstan for limitation purposes without a claimant knowing the identity of the wrongdoer. Secondly, Mr Howe submitted that the application of the three-year limitation period under the KCC would cause undue hardship (and so conflict with public policy) within the meaning of section 2(2).

550.          Mr Twigger submitted that there should be no disapplication of the Kazakh law three-year limitation period since there is no conflict with public policy in this case. He observed that the application of the Kazakh law on limitation serves the same policy concerns in this case as limitation periods do in any other country (including in England and Wales). He highlighted, quite correctly, that limitation periods serve a useful function in managing the difficulties faced by a defendant when answering stale claims. He went on to submit that the Claimants’ burden of proving a conflict with public policy is a heavy one. He relied in this context on KXL v Nicholas Murphy [2016] EWHC 3102 (QB), a decision in which Wilkie J considered whether Ugandan law on limitation, which applied a three-year limitation period upon reaching the age of 18 on the claimants’ allegations of sexual abuse and assaults by a religious brother stationed in Uganda, would conflict with public policy and/or cause undue hardship to the claimants. Wilkie J answered that question in the negative. Mr Twigger drew particular attention to the fact that, as he explained at [53], Wilkie J approached the matter on the basis that the conflict with public policy must be “a conflict with fundamental principles of justice readily and clearly identifiable”. He highlighted also that, in setting out the applicable principles at [45], Wilkie J drew particular attention to the following:

“i)   It would be wrong to treat a foreign limitation period as contrary to English public policy simply because it is less generous than the comparable English provision in force at the time (Durham v T&N plc 1996 Court of Appeal unreported).

ii)  Public policy should be invoked for the purposes of disapplying the foreign limitation period only in exceptional circumstances. Too ready a resort to public policy would frustrate our system of private international law which exists to fulfil foreign rights not destroy them.

iii)   Foreign law should only be disapplied where it is contrary to a fundamental principle of justice.

iv)   The fundamental principle of justice with which it is said foreign law conflicts must be clearly identifiable. The process of identification must not depend upon a Judges individual notion of expediency or fairness but upon the possibility of recognising, with clarity, a principle derived from our own law of limitation or some other clearly recognised principle of public policy. English courts should not invoke public policy save in cases where foreign law is manifestly incompatible with public policy. (City of Gotha v Sothebys, Transcript October 8 1998 p89).”

Mr Twigger also relied upon what Wilkie J went on to say concerning undue hardship at [54], specifically in sub-paragraph (ix) as follows:

“The question can be framed in the following manner. Does the application of the foreign limitation period deprive the claimant of his claim in circumstances where he did not have a reasonable opportunity to pursue it timeously if acting with reasonable diligence and with knowledge of its potential application, where the claimant is deemed to have knowledge of the application of the relevant foreign limitation period (Naraji v Shelbourne 2011 EWHC 3298(QB) at paragraph 177, and, Bank of St. Petersburg v Arkhangelsky 2013 EWHC 3674 CH at paras 15 and 17).”

551.          Mr Twigger’s submission was that, applying these principles and since this is not an exceptional case, there is no justification in the present case for the Claimants’ suggestion that the Kazakh law three-year limitation period should be disapplied under sub-sections 2(1) and (2) of the 1984 Act.

552.          Before coming on to deal with this submission and Mr Howe’s responses to it, I should first refer to certain other authorities. The first is City of Gotha v Sotheby’s and Cobert Financa SA, 9 September 1998 (unrep.). This case involved a painting by Joachim Wtewael which, at the end of the Second World War, disappeared from the collection in the gallery of the Ducal Family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha in the City of Gotha, only to reappear when offered for sale by Sotheby’s in 1992. The claimants sought the return of the painting. Moses J had to decide, first, who had title to the painting and, secondly, whether the claim was time-barred under German law. As to the latter, he concluded that the relevant German limitation period (30 years) had not expired by the time that the proceedings were commenced. He went on, however, to consider whether, had he concluded that the claim was time-barred under German law, it would have been appropriate to disapply the limitation period pursuant to section 2 of the 1984 Act. He drew attention to the fact that the argument advanced by the claimants in support of the contention that the limitation period should be disapplied included the point that under German law “no account is taken of the plaintiffs’ state of knowledge”. It was also relied upon in argument that the defendants in that case had (as Moses J concluded) deliberately concealed facts relevant to the right of action (including details of Cobert Finance SA’s identity). Moses J explained that, in his view, it is not “possible to identify with sufficient clarity a public policy which deprives the defendant of the benefit of time which is already running his favour before he is guilty of deliberate concealment” and so “it is not possible to disapply a foreign law of limitation merely because that foreign law does not recognise the same consequences of concealment as those which the House of Lords has recognised to be the consequences of section 32(1)(b)” of the Limitation Act 1980. He then referred to section 4 of the 1980 Act and the fact that the effect of this provision would have been, had English law applied, that the plaintiffs would not have been met with a time bar argument in circumstances where the painting had been stolen (as was the case in that case). He then said this:

“It does seem to me possible to identify, from that legislation, a public policy in England that time is not to run either in favour of the thief nor in favour of any transferee who is not a purchaser in good faith. The law favours the true owner of property which has been stolen, however long the period which has elapsed since the original theft. If German limitation law is not disapplied the result will be to favour a purchaser with no title to the painting who does not even contend that it or its predecessors purchased the painting in good faith. To permit a party which admits it has not acted in good faith to retain the advantage of lapse of time during which the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the painting and no possibility of recovering it is, in my judgement, contrary to the public policy which finds statutory expression in Section 4. To allow Cobert to succeed, when, on its own admission it knew or suspected that the painting might be stolen or that there was something wrong with the transaction or acted in a manner in which an honest man would not, does touch the conscience of the court. Moreover, to recognise such a public policy does not in any way undermine the purposes of a law of limitation; there is no reason why a defendant in the position of Cobert should be protected from this claim nor does the recognition of such a public policy discourage claimants from instituting proceedings without unreasonable delay. … It does not seem to me that the question whether a foreign law should be disapplied on grounds of English public policy can depend upon the nature of the plaintiff seeking to disapply that law. I should, however, make it clear that if the victim of the theft had itself delayed once it had discovered the facts relevant to its cause of action that might well be a ground for not disapplying the foreign law.”

Moses J then went on to deal with undue hardship specifically, saying this:

“The plaintiffs rely also upon Section 2(2) of the 1984 Act contending that they would be caused undue hardship if German limitation law was applied. In Jones v Trollope Colls Cementation Overseas Ltd (Times Law Reports 26 January 1990), Farquharson LJ said that:

‘the word undue added something more than just hardship. It meant excessive or greater hardship than the circumstances warranted.’

In AMF v Hashim … Evans J emphasised that the provision was intended to have a narrow application (page 952). Moreover he said:

‘It cannot be said that the three-year period for claims of this sort (under Gulf law) is so short that the plaintiffs suffer undue hardship merely by reason of the fact that it is imposed. There must be some additional factors which make the hardship excessive in this case.’

That additional factor might have arisen if the plaintiffs had been defeated because of transitional provisions which were not easy to apply (see page 593 and Saville LJ in the Court of Appeal at page 600). In the instant case the additional circumstance upon which reliance is placed over and above the mere impact of a limitation period of thirty years, is that the plaintiffs were the victims of theft and between that theft and 1991, they had no means of discovering the facts which would have enabled them to identify the possessor of the painting and its whereabouts. But it is difficult to see how that additional fact would justify invoking Section 2(2) in circumstances where Section 2(1) did not apply. Either the public policy which I have already identified exists or it does not. If it does not, then all the plaintiffs are, in essence, complaining about is the length of the German limitation period. That by itself is not enough, and in those circumstances had I not been prepared to display German law under Section 2(1), I would not have done so under Section 2(2).”

553.          In further support of his submission that, at least as the Defendants (and Professor Suleimenov) portray it, the Kazakh law on limitation is in conflict with public policy, Mr Howe also drew my attention to Durham v T & N PLC and others, 1 May 1996 (unrep.), in which Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) commented that if “the law of Quebec provided, as English law once did, that a limitation period ran from the date of sustaining personal injury irrespective of whether a claimant did, or even could, know of his injury at that time, it would be strongly arguable that such a rule would cause a plaintiff undue hardship and so conflict with English public policy”.

554.          As I say, I shall in a moment come on to deal with this point, after first addressing what Mr Howe had to say concerning the KXL case. Mr Howe drew particular attention to the fact that Wilkie J in that case does not appear to have had cited to him the Court of Appeal decision in one of the cases to which he referred in setting out the principle relied on by Mr Twigger at [54(ix)], namely Bank of St Petersburg v Arkhangelsky [2014] EWCA Civ 593[2014] 1 WLR 4360, since the case citation given by Wilkie J in that sub-paragraph is a reference not to the decision of the Court of Appeal but to the decision of Hildyard J at first instance. Mr Howe submitted, in effect, that, had Wilkie J been referred to the Court of Appeal decision, his description of the principle identified in sub-paragraph (ix) would have been different, in that Wilkie J would have included reference to it being necessary, when assessing whether there has been undue hardship, if a claimant is himself at fault in failing to commence proceedings within time, to consider whether the consequences are out of proportion to the claimant’s fault.

555.          The Bank of St Petersburg case was a case in which Hildyard J had extended the relevant three-year limitation period for a variety of reasons, as summarised by Longmore LJ at [10] and (because, in fact, Hildyard J was obliged to give a second judgment after two further authorities had been cited to him) at [17] where Longmore LJ identified the “essential factors” as being:

“(i) the Arkhangelskys’ impecuniosity and disorientation resulting in their being out-gunned and out-lawyered; (ii) their reasonable expectation that Baker & McKenzie would be instructed to accept service of the Commercial Court proceedings; (iii) the ‘hardball’ attitude of the Bank and Mr Savelyev in refusing so to instruct them; (iv) the inherent likelihood of difficulty, delay and expense in attempting to serve in Russia proceedings which called into question the integrity of the Russian courts; (v) the limited time available between the agreement for English jurisdiction in December 2011 and the expiry of the limitation period in March 2012; and (vi) the disproportionality and unfairness which would occur if the Arkhangelskys were denied the opportunity of bringing claims of which the Bank had long been aware after agreeing that their claims could be substantially litigated in England.”

Longmore LJ then went on at [18] to record the submission which was made by the appellant challenging Hildyard J’s decision to dissaply:

“Mr Marshall’s main submission was that the judge had not appreciated that, for the purposes of section 2(1) of the 1984 Act, it had to be the application of the Russian limitation provision that had given rise to the undue hardship. He submitted that the real cause of any hardship in this case was that it had taken two years for the Arkhangelskys to begin any proceedings and that the proceedings in the BVI were misconceived; the short time between the agreement for English jurisdiction and the expiry of the Russian time limit only occurred because of the Arkhangelskys’ delays at a time when they did have sufficient money to institute and pursue proceedings as they had in Cyprus; in any event they did institute English proceedings within time so the application of the Russian time limit could not be said to have caused any hardship at all.”

He continued at [19]:

“For this purpose he cited the two authorities which had not been cited to the judge before his first judgment, Harley v Smith [2010] EWCA Civ 78 reported at [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359 at first instance but curiously not reported in those reports in the Court of Appeal and Naraji v Shelbourne [2010] EWHC 3298 (Comm) in which Popplewell J at paragraph 176 considered the question to be whether the time period prescribed by the limitation provision is such that its application would deprive the claimant of his claim in circumstances where he did not have a reasonable opportunity to pursue it if acting with reasonable diligence and with knowledge of its potential application. I agree with this description of the question.”

This, it is worth noting, is essentially the point, based as it is on Popplewell J’s decision in the Naraji case to which Wilkie J also referred at [54(ix)] in the KXL case, that Wilkie J made when identifying the principle which he did in that sub-paragraph. What follows in the judgment of Longmore LJ was not, however, included. This is hardly surprising, of course, if (as it would appear) the Court of Appeal decision was not before Wilkie J.

556.          Longmore LJ went on at [20] to say this:

“The only other authority which needs citation is the decision of this court in Jones v Trollope Colls Cementation Overseas Ltd The Times 26th January 1990, [1990] WL 754869 which applied the well-known (at least to those with arbitration practices) decision of Liberian Shipping Corporation v A. King and Sons Ltd [1967] 2 QB 86 in which Lord Denning MR addressed the question of undue hardship (at page 98G): ‘undue’ … simply means excessive. It means greater hardship than the circumstances warrant. Even though a claimant has been at fault himself, it is an undue hardship on him if the consequences are out of proportion to his fault.”

He continued at [21]:

“Guided by these authorities, I find I am in agreement with the judge. Applying the Russian time limit in this case to prevent any counterclaim by OMG Ports causes both the Arkhangelskys and OMG Ports undue hardship because, even though they may have been to some extent at fault e.g. in not applying sooner than they did for an order dispensing with the service of their Commercial Court claim or in not finding enough money to translate the proceedings into Russian and serving them pursuant to the Hague Convention on Service of Proceedings on the Bank in Russia, the consequences of being unable to pursue their counterclaim (which the Bank and Mr Savelyev had already agreed could be pursued in England) are out of proportion to that fault.”

Nor, no doubt again because he was not shown what the Court of Appeal had to say, did Wilkie in the KXL case make any reference to what Longmore LJ stated by way of conclusion at [23] to [25]:

“It can also be said that the Arkhangelskys should have begun proceedings before 2011, granted that they knew their rights had been violated in March 2009 but that is something of a counsel of perfection if one’s business world is disintegrating and it is necessary to emigrate and find a roof over one’s head. To begin proceedings towards the end of the limitation period may be risky and to that extent blameworthy but the judge was entitled to think that the consequence of losing one’s claim was out of proportion to that fault.

Mr Marshall also launched an attack on the idea that impecuniosity had any relevance to the question of undue hardship, unless the lack of funds was actually caused by the Bank. That cannot be right; the court has to look at all the circumstances in order to decide whether the application of the foreign limitation period will cause undue hardship and impecuniosity must be highly relevant to that question. In any event the judge held (para 19(b) of his second judgment) that the Arkhangelskys’ impecuniosity did indeed arise from the bringing of the Russian proceedings and their exile from Russia. I have already dealt with the question whether the judge was entitled to find impecuniosity at all.

I conclude therefore that the judge directed himself properly as to the law on the question of undue hardship under section 2(2) of the 1984 Act and applied the law correctly to the facts. He had to adopt a multi-factorial approach with which this court should not interfere unless satisfied that he was wrong. I am not so satisfied and would dismiss the second appeal.”

557.          It was Mr Howe’s submission, stripped to its essence, that it would be a mistake to view Wilkie J in the KXL case as having framed the relevant question at [54(ix)] entirely accurately. I agree with Mr Howe about this. Although it is understandable why Wilkie J did not go on to make the further point made by Longmore LJ based on Lord Denning MR’s dictum in the Liberian Shipping case given that he was not shown the Court of Appeal judgment in the Bank of St Petersburg case (although he did have cited to him the Jones v Trollope case which applied the dictum), it is quite clear that it is appropriate to approach the question of undue hardship on the basis that (as Lord Denning MR put it) “‘undue’ … simply means excessive. It means greater hardship than the circumstances warrant. Even though a claimant has been at fault himself, it is an undue hardship on him if the consequences are out of proportion to his fault.”

558.          Turning now to the reasons why the Claimants say that the three-year limitation period under the KCC should be disapplied, there are two aspects to these. The first is Mr Howe’s submission that the Kazakh law on limitation is, in and of itself, in conflict with public policy. The second is his submission that the Claimants would suffer undue hardship (specifically identified in section 2(2) of the 1984 Act as an example of conflict with public policy) if the limitation period were not disapplied, in particular the point that it would be out of all proportion to any fault on the Claimants’ part to deprive them of their claims.

559.          The first of these submissions has three aspects. First, it is submitted by Mr Howe that if time starts to run for limitation purposes even though a potential claimant does not know the identity of the (alleged) wrongdoer, this would result in what he described as “great injustice” because the claimant would, in effect, be “deprived of its claim before it even has a chance to bring it”. This point goes nowhere, however, since, as Mr Twigger pointed out, in the present case there can be no argument that the Claimants have not had a reasonable opportunity to pursue their claim because they were not aware of the identity of the wrongdoer. In any event, as I have previously explained, I am somewhat doubtful that Professor Suleimenov was right in what he had to say concerning the need for the identity of the wrongdoer to be known. Indeed, in relation to claims under Articles 62 and 63 of the JSC law, he ultimately accepted that it is necessary to identify the particular company officer involved. Secondly, Mr Howe suggested that, if time should be taken as running from when a potential claimant has only “a general knowledge” that its rights have been violated, then, again, this is something which ought to be regarded as contrary to public policy. The difficulty with this is that Professor Suleimenov’s evidence was not to that effect but that one needs “reasonable grounds to believe” and, ultimately, Mr Vataev agreed with Mr Twigger about this. It is impossible to take the view that, this being the level of knowledge or awareness required, the Kazakh law on limitation is in conflict with public policy. Thirdly, Mr Howe sought to suggest that, if it is the case that Article 185.1 of the KCC only permits ‘restoration’ in the case of claimants who are natural persons and does not also apply to legal entities such as companies then, this, too, is contrary to public policy since there can be no justification for depriving corporate entities of rights afforded to individuals. Again, I struggle with this as a proposition. It seems to me that this simply cannot be the conflict with public policy which Mr Howe suggested. Indeed, as Mr Twigger pointed out, English law might be thought to have a similar provision to Article 185.1 in the shape of section 28(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 which provides as follows:

“Subject to the following provisions of this section, if on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.”

This is a provision which applies, and only applies, to natural persons; there is no equivalent provision dealing with companies. In the circumstances, it can hardly be said that Kazakh law on limitation is in conflict with public policy here.

560.          I come on, then, to deal with Mr Howe’s submissions in relation to undue hardship. His overall submission, in line with the approach to what amounts to undue hardship described by Lord Denning MR in the Liberian Shipping case, was that it would be out of all proportion to any fault on the Claimants’ part to deprive them of their claim; indeed, he suggested, not to disapply the limitation period in such circumstances would in effect be assisting the Defendants to commit “the perfect fraud” (the description used by Jackson LJ in the Court of Appeal hearing in this case which took place in 2014: [2014] EWCA Civ 381).

561.          Three particular points were made by Mr Howe in support of this overarching submission. First, Mr Howe drew attention to the fact that, if the limitation period is not disapplied, then, there are shareholders, employees and creditors of the Claimants, all of whom would be prejudiced. However, I see no merit in this point since, as Mr Twigger submitted, a company is controlled by its management and, if they fail to commence proceedings within the limitation period, any hardship that this causes to the company’s shareholders and creditors is caused by that failure. It is not a reason to disapply a limitation period on the basis that there has been undue hardship to the Claimants (the companies). I had the impression that Mr Howe recognised that he was not on the strongest of grounds on this point since it is fair to say that he did not place much (if any) weight on the point.

562.          I do, nonetheless, consider that there is merit in Mr Howe’s two other points. The first of these was that, in circumstances where (as I have, indeed, now decided) the Claimants are victims of fraud on a significant scale, it would result in the clearest possible undue hardship were the Kazakh law time-bar not to be disapplied. I acknowledge that in some cases the fact that a claimant is aware or “should have become aware” for the purposes of Article 180.1 of the KCC will mean that there ought not to be disapplication of the 3-year limitation period. It cannot be an absolute bar, however, since, if that were the case, it would mean that the 1984 Act could never apply to the Kazakh law limitation period. Furthermore, it is obvious that the undue hardship test must apply even where there has been fault. Ultimately, the degree of fault is but a factor to be weighed in the balance. In the present case, I consider that any fault which might have resulted in the Claims becoming time-barred (had that been the case) was not at such a level as to warrant a decision not to disapply. The Claims are not only far from trivial but are also very substantial. The result is that the hardship to the Claimants in being prevented from making a recovery would be very great indeed. Furthermore, even had I reached a different conclusion on the ‘awareness’ issues, what is clear is that the frauds were not obvious. Indeed, I consider that there is considerable force in Mr Howe’s submission that the Defendants went to considerable lengths to hide their tracks, as demonstrated by, for example, Ms Dikhanbayeva’s “If the auditors are raising questions” email on 27 August 2009 and the many instances where contracts were drawn up on Ms Dikhanbayeva’s instructions seemingly with the express intention of covering up fraudulent activity. In my view, there is also considerable force in Mr Howe’s further submission that there should be disapplication in circumstances where the very fraud which has brought about the claims has meant that the Claimants have had to face a critical and ongoing financial crisis entailing what Mr Howe characterised as “a fight for their very survival” which has meant that the Claimants had to concentrate their efforts on things other than the bringing of the claims. Although Mr Twigger suggested that there is no evidence to justify a conclusion that the KK Group has been in any such fight as a result of anything done by the Defendants, it is wholly unrealistic to dispute that this was the position. The evidence of Mr Werner, in particular, on this issue is very clear. I accept that evidence.

563.          For these reasons, it follows that, had it been necessary, I would have regarded it as being appropriate to disapply the Kazakh law limitation period under the 1984 Act. I should make it clear that, in the circumstances which I have described, I would have been prepared to disapply not only had I decided that the Claims were time-barred because the Claimants “should have become aware” for the purposes of Article 180.1 of the KCC, but also had I decided that the Claimants had actual awareness. This is because, even on Mr Arip’s and Ms Dikhanbayeva’s case, the awareness which the Claimants should be treated as having had was not particularly extensive, largely being derived from the PwC Russia report, and because, as I have mentioned, the Defendants were engaged in efforts to cover their tracks. In the light of my conclusions on the limitation issue, however, there is no reason, in fact, to make an order under the 1984 Act.