ANOTHER CLAIM FORM CASE: SERVICE AT “LAST KNOWN ADDRESS” FAILS: SERVICE BASED ON COMPANIES ACT SUCCEEDS

Cases on the last known address for service seem to come along like buses – a few at at time. The issue was considered by Mr Richard Salter QC (setting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) in Idemia France SAS v Decatur Europe Ltd & Ors [2019] EWHC 946 (Comm).  The claimant failed, demonstrably, to show that it had  properly served at the “last known address”.  However the claimant succeeded on the issue of service under s.1140 of the Companies Act 2006.

 

“The requirement under CPR 6.9(3) to “take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence” is not an onerous one. If, as in the present case, the defendant can be contacted, a simple first step would be to ask the defendant for their address. Claimants who choose not to take such reasonable steps, in the face of protestations by a defendant that the address which the claimant has for them is wrong, do so at their own risk.”

A company director or secretary resident abroad is under no obligation to register an address for service that is within the jurisdiction. Mr Rahman could (and should, if he wished to avoid the jurisdiction of the English courts over him) have changed his registered address to his new address in Bangladesh when he ceased to be resident in England. He did not do so. His omission to do so meant that he remained subject to the jurisdiction of the English court, by virtue of having a registered service address that was within the jurisdiction.”

THE CASE

The claimant brought an action against several defendants. One of those defendants, Mr Rahman,  stated that he had not been properly served.  The claimant served Mr Rahman at an address where he was known to have left.  This was held not to be sufficient.  (However in this case there is a plot twist).

JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LAST KNOWN ADDRESS: THE CLAIMANT FAILS

 

“Jurisdiction in relation to Mr Rahman
    1. Idemia’s case for jurisdiction over Mr Rahman was originally based upon the assertion that he was domiciled in England. Mr Rahman accepts that he moved to London with his then wife and son of the start of 2014, and rented and lived at York Way. His evidence is that he subsequently acquired the long leasehold interest in two apartments at the Plimsoll Building, 1 Handyside Street London, and that he and his family moved into the larger of these two properties (F9-02) in about November 2015.
    2. However, according to Mr Rahman, his marriage broke down in 2016 and there were divorce proceedings. His ex-wife returned to Bangladesh in about March 2017, leaving their son with him in London. At the start of 2018, his mother was diagnosed with motor neurone disease. Mr Rahman says that, because of these personal considerations, and the fact that his European business had not proved as successful as he had hoped, in January 2018 he ceased to live in London and returned to live in Bangladesh permanently. Mr Rahman therefore asserts that, since January 2018, he has been resident and domiciled in Bangladesh.
    3. Mr Midwinter, on behalf of Idemia, has made it clear that Idemia does not accept the truthfulness of Mr Rahman’s assertions about his domicile and residence. Nevertheless, Mr Midwinter realistically accepts that he cannot effectively challenge Mr Rahman’s evidence for the purposes of these applications. I must therefore proceed on the basis that what Mr Rahman has said about those matters is true. It follows that Idemia cannot base its claim that the English courts have jurisdiction over Mr Rahman on his domicile or his usual place of residence.
    4. Idemia, however, also bases its claim that the English courts have jurisdiction over Mr Rahman on its assertion that he has been validly served within the jurisdiction, either at York Way or at Morris Place[24].
    5. Under Article 6(1) of the Judgments Regulation (recast):
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of that Member State.
    1. At common law, jurisdiction can be founded by serving a defendant within the jurisdiction. It is for Idemia to establish that Mr Rahman has been properly served within the jurisdiction. If Idemia can do that, it will then be for Mr Rahman to show that the court ought to stay the proceedings on
 forum non conveniens
    1. grounds
Last known residence
    1. Idemia’s case that service at York Way was good and effective service on Mr Rahman is based on its assertion that York Way was, as at the date of service, Mr Rahman’s “last known residence”, even though he was not actually resident there, either at the date when proceedings were commenced or at the date of service.
    2. CPR 6.3(1) provides that:
A claim form may .. be served by any of the following methods –
    1. .
.(c) leaving it at a place specified in rule .. 6.9
    1. CPR 6.9(2) then provides that, where that rule applies:
Subject to paragraphs (3) to (6), the claim form must be served on the defendant at the place shown in the following table.
Nature of defendant to be served
Place of service
1. Individual
Usual or last known residence.
    1. Paragraphs (3) to (6) of CPR 6.9 then specify what is to happen if the claimant has reason to believe that the defendant no longer resides at his last known address.
(3) Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant referred to in entries 1, 2 or 3 in the table in paragraph (2) is an address at which the defendant no longer resides or carries on business, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence or place of business (‘current address’).(4) Where, having taken the reasonable steps required by paragraph (3), the claimant –(a) ascertains the defendant’s current address, the claim form must be served at that address; or(b) is unable to ascertain the defendant’s current address, the claimant must consider whether there is –(i) an alternative place where; or(ii) an alternative method by which,service may be effected.(5) If, under paragraph (4)(b), there is such a place where or a method by which service may be effected, the claimant must make an application under rule 6.15.(6) Where paragraph (3) applies, the claimant may serve on the defendant’s usual or last known address in accordance with the table in paragraph (2) where the claimant –(a) cannot ascertain the defendant’s current residence or place of business; and(b) cannot ascertain an alternative place or an alternative method under paragraph (4)(b).
    1. The meaning of the phrase “last known residence” in the predecessor to the present CPR 6.9[26] was considered by the Court of Appeal in Collier v Williams[27]. Dyson LJ, giving the judgment of the court, gave the following guidance[28]:
What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words “last known”? As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draughtsman of the rules deliberately chose the word “known”. In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party’s actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence.
However, the provisions considered by the Court of Appeal in Collier v Williams[29] did not include any equivalent to the present CPR 6.9(3) which expressly refers to “reason to believe“. More recently, in Varsani v Relfo[30], the Court of Appeal has noted that there remain “a number of difficulties and obscurities in the wording of CPR r 6.9”.
    1. In Mr Midwinter’s submission, to the best of Idemia’s actual or constructive knowledge at the material time, York Way was still Mr Rahman’s residence. He relies upon the evidence in Mr Gadhia’s first witness statement that York Way appeared in the Companies House records for Decatur as Mr Rahman’s “Service Address” and that, before serving Mr Rahman, Mr Gadhia’s firm had on 25 May 2018 sent a pre-action letter by courier to Mr Rahman at the York Way address:
The Pre-Action Letter was delivered by courier and the delivery receipt was signed by a person named Abrahim, who is described by the delivery notes as “the porter who is going to take the package over to addresse” 
    1. [sic].
 I infer that a person at that address would not have signed a letter for Mr Rahman if Mr Rahman did not reside there ..[31]
However, that pre-action letter was also sent by courier to Decatur at Morris Place and to Tiger at its registered office in Bangladesh. It was also sent by email to all 3 Defendants. In the circumstances, it is not possible to be confident that it was the particular copy of the pre-action letter delivered at York Way that actually came to the notice of Mr Rahman, and which produced a response on his behalf.
      1. On behalf of Mr Rahman, Mr Clarke submits that Idemia already had reason to believe that Mr Rahman no longer resided at York Way by the time that it purported to serve him there. In those circumstances, according to Mr Clarke, Idemia was obliged by CPR 6.9(3) to “take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence”, and could no longer rely upon its belief that York Way was Mr Rahman’s residence.
      2. Mr Clarke relies upon the evidence given by Mr Gadhia in his second witness statement[32] to the effect that, when on 6 June 2018, the courier attempted to deliver the claim documents at York Way:

    .

. the concierge of the building called the apartment and was told that Mr Rahman does not live there, and that the concierge said that Mr Rahman was not on the list of people who live in the building. The claim documents were therefore returned to my firm.
    1. Mr Clarke also relies on two letters sent on behalf of Mr Rahman to Idemia’s solicitors by a Polish lawyer, Ms Magdalena Selwa, of Sadkowski i Wspolnicy sp k legal office (“Sadkowski”). The first letter, dated 4 June 2018, stated:
Please note that my Client, to whom you are addressing your letters, is neither a citizen nor a resident of the United Kingdom.
    1. The second letter, dated 7 June 2018, stated:
Contrary to your allegations, my client [Mr Rahman] does not appear to be domiciled in England (or in any other part of the United Kingdom), and in my previous letter of 4 June 2018 I have already clearly stated that [Mr Rahman] is not a resident of the United Kingdom – meaning is not domiciled in the United Kingdom, and in particular he is not domiciled in England. For the record, the address stated in your letter 25 May 2018 as my Clients address is incorrect. The apartment under that address [York Way] had been rented by my client, but the rental agreement expired in October 2015 ..
    1. .
. [Mr Rahman] is living in Bangladesh and he has the intention to stay there permanently in the foreseeable future. [Mr Rahman] is therefore domiciled in Bangladesh.
      1. Mr Gadhia’s evidence confirms that both of these letters were received by his firm before the proceedings were left by Idemia’s process server at York Way later on 7 June 2018 (and again on 8 June 2018) by way of intended service.

      2. The issue which I have to decide is whether, in those circumstances, Idemia could still properly serve these proceedings on Mr Rahman at York Way as his “last known” residence. In my judgment, that was not a course which was open to Idemia. It seems to me that, by the time that the service on which Idemia now relies was effected, Idemia had sufficient reason to believe that Mr Rahman no longer lived at York Way. It had been told by the concierge at York Way that Mr Rahman was not on the list of people who lived there and had been told by Sadkowski that Mr Rahman was now living in Bangladesh. In those circumstances, Idemia was no longer entitled to effect service there, but was required by CPR 6.9(3) to take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence, and thereafter to follow the procedure set out in sub-paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) of the rule.
      3. The intention behind these substituted provisions of the CPR is plain. It is to provide a simple, clear and straightforward code relating to service, balancing the interests of claimants against the:

    .

. fundamental principle of our law that no one is to be found guilty or made liable by an order of any tribunal unless he has been given fair notice of the proceedings so as to enable him to appear and defend them ..[33]
    1. Under that code, a claimant is entitled to serve a defendant at his “usual or last-known residence” within the jurisdiction. However, the claimant can only rely upon “last-known” if it he has no reason to believe that that is not still the defendant’s usual residence. If the claimant does have reason to believe that the defendant is no longer usually resident at that address, the claimant cannot validly serve the defendant at that address, but must take reasonable steps to find out where the defendant does now live, or a place and/or method by which the proceedings may effectively be brought to the defendant’s attention. If the claimant can ascertain the current address or a way in which the proceedings can effectively be brought to the defendant’s attention, the claimant must apply to the court under CPR 6.15 for an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. Only in the exceptional case where, having taken the required reasonable steps, the claimant cannot discover the defendant’s current address or any alternative means of bringing the proceedings effectively to the defendant’s attention, can the claimant revert to service at the “last-known” address of the defendant.
    2. The scheme of this code gives rise to 2 subsidiary questions: first, what is the date by reference to which the claimant’s knowledge and belief is to be assessed; and, secondly, what standard of “reason to believe” is required in order to trigger the procedure required by CPR6.9(3)?
    3. With regard to the relevant date, questions of jurisdiction are normally to be determined by reference to the date of the commencement of proceedings, here 6 June 2018[34]. The reason for that is to enable the claimant to know at the time proceedings are commenced that they have been commenced on the right court. In accordance with that principle, in her recent judgment in the case of Tugushev v Orlov[35], Carr J held that:
The time for determination of [the defendant’s] domicile or usual residence is the date of issue of the claim form.
  1. The use of the date of the commencement of proceedings, however, makes much less practical sense in the context of the code which I have just described. In the present case, Idemia properly wrote pre-action letters. However, the position can better be tested by considering a claimant who has failed to take that sensible course, has issued proceedings believing that the defendant is usually resident at a particular address within the jurisdiction, but has thereafter expressly been told that the defendant has moved to a different address within the jurisdiction (which is supplied). Could it be right that that claimant could still validly serve at the original address as the “last-known” address, while actually knowing that it was no longer a valid address for the defendant? It seems to me that that is unlikely to have been what the framers of the code intended.
  2. As is pointed out in the notes at paragraph 12.3.2 of Civil Procedure, a default judgment obtained after valid service under CPR 6.9 at the defendant’s last-known address cannot be set aside as of right simply because the proceedings have not come to the attention of the defendant. Such a defendant must comply with CPR 13.3(1), and must satisfy the court that they have applied promptly and that their defence has a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason why a trial should be conducted. That all suggests that the rules should be interpreted in a way which limits the circumstances in which valid service can be effected at an address which the claimant has reason to believe at the moment of service is no longer current.
  3. As for what amounts to “reason to believe”, it would not be helpful for me to attempt to gloss the words of the CPR. However, the fact that Idemia persisted in serving the present action at York Way, despite having been expressly told that Mr Rahman no longer lived there, may perhaps indicate their belief that claimants are entitled under CPR 6.9 to disregard what they are told by defendants about where they actually live, on the basis that defendants have an incentive to lie about such matters in order to evade service.
  4. In my judgment, the wording and structure of the new code means that any such belief would be misconceived. There may, perhaps, be cases in which a claimant would be entitled to continue to believe (for the purposes of relying on an address as the “last-known” address) that a defendant continued to live at a particular address, despite that defendant’s protestations to the contrary. But, in my judgment, such cases will be rare. The requirement under CPR 6.9(3) to “take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence” is not an onerous one. If, as in the present case, the defendant can be contacted, a simple first step would be to ask the defendant for their address. Claimants who choose not to take such reasonable steps, in the face of protestations by a defendant that the address which the claimant has for them is wrong, do so at their own risk.
  5. Fortunately, I am not required finally to decide either of these questions for the purposes of these applications. Mr Midwinter and Mr Clarke both argued the applications before me on the basis that the relevant date was the date of purported service: and I am, in any event, satisfied that at both dates Idemia had sufficient “reason to believe” that Mr Rahman no longer lived at York Way to prevent that address from being his “last-known” address unless and until Idemia had followed the procedure laid down in CPR 6.9(3).
  6. Mr Rahman’s challenge to the purported service of this action on him at York Way therefore succeeds.

THE PLOT TWIST: SERVICE UNDER s.1140 of the COMPANIES ACT 2006: THE CLAIMANT SUCCEEDS

However the judge found that there was good service under s.1140 of the Companies Act 2006

THE JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE
Companies Act 2006 s 1140
    1. Idemia, however, has a second basis for its argument that Mr Rahman has validly been served within the jurisdiction. It relies upon the Companies Act 2006 s 1140. This states that:
Service of documents on directors, secretaries and others
(1) A document may be served on a person to whom this section applies by leaving it at, or sending it by post to, the person’s registered address.
(2) This section applies to—
(a) a director or secretary of a company;
(b) in the case of an overseas company whose particulars are registered under section 1046, a person holding any such position as may be specified for the purposes of this section by regulations under that section;
..
(3) This section applies whatever the purpose of the document in question. It is not restricted to service for purposes arising out of or in connection with the appointment or position mentioned in subsection (2) or in connection with the company concerned.
(4) For the purposes of this section a person’s “registered address” means any address for the time being shown as a current address in relation to that person in the part of the register available for public inspection.
(5) If notice of a change of that address is given to the registrar, a person may validly serve a document at the address previously registered until the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which notice of the change is registered.
(6) Service may not be effected by virtue of this section at an address—
(a) if notice has been registered of the termination of the appointment in relation to which the address was registered and the address is not a registered address of the person concerned in relation to any other appointment;
(b) in the case of a person holding any such position as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b), if the overseas company has ceased to have any connection with the United Kingdom by virtue of which it is required to register particulars under section 1046.
(7) Further provision as to service and other matters is made in the company communications provisions (see section 1143).
(8) Nothing in this section shall be read as affecting any enactment or rule of law under which permission is required for service out of the jurisdiction.
    1. It is common ground that, both at the date when this action was commenced and at the time of service, Mr Rahman was a director of various UK companies (including Decatur) and that Morris Place was his “registered address” in relation to those companies for the purposes of s 1140.
    2. The scope of s 1140 was considered by Master Marsh (before his appointment as Chief Master) in Key Homes Bradford Ltd v Patel[36]. Master Marsh held that the effect of s 1140 is that, when a company director gives an address for service in England and Wales, he can validly be served at that address, even if he is domiciled and resident overseas. Master Marsh’s decision was recently followed and applied by ICC Judge Jones in Brouwer v Anstey[37].
    3. It is also common ground that, if the decision in Key Homes is correct, Mr Rahman has been validly served at Morris Place, and that the English court therefore has jurisdiction over him. What Mr Clarke submits on behalf of Mr Rahman is that Key Homes was wrongly decided, and should not be followed. In Mr Clarke’s submission (and contrary to the view taken by Master Marsh), the fundamental principles of the common law have not been abrogated by this statutory provision. Service under s 1140(1) at a registered address within the jurisdiction will therefore only be valid if the person to be served is within the jurisdiction of the time of service. That that is the case is shown, in Mr Clarke’s submission, by s 1140(8) which expressly preserves “any .. rule of law under which permission is required for service out of the jurisdiction”.
    4. This fundamental principle of the common law was considered by Master Marsh in his judgment in Key Homes[38]. He began by citing the well-known statement of the principle by Lawrence Collins J (as he then was) in Chellaram v Chellaram (No 2)[39] that:
.. [I]t has always been, and remains, a fundamental rule of English procedure and jurisdiction that a defendant may be served with originating process within the jurisdiction only if he is present in the jurisdiction at the time of service, or deemed service.
    1. After examining the consideration of this principle by the Court of Appeal in the cases of Rolph v Zolan[40]City & Country Properties Limited v Kamali[41]; and SSL International Plc v TTK LIG Ltd[42], Master Marsh concluded that that principle did not preclude service under s 1140 on a registered address within the jurisdiction from being effective, even if the person to be served was not in fact resident or physically present within the jurisdiction at the time of service:
Section 1140 in my judgment provides a basis for serving a director which is entirely outside the provisions for service in the CPR. It is a parallel code. The disapproval by the Court of Appeal in Kamali of the general principle enunciated by Lawrence Collins J in Chellaram was expressed in broad terms. It seems to me it is inherently unlikely that in passing s 1140 of the 2006 Act, Parliament can have intended what was clearly designed to be a new manner in which company directors could be served should be subject to a common-law principle which is directly contrary to the clear terms of the section. Nothing in s 1140 suggests that its provisions are limited such as to prevent service upon a director who is not resident within the jurisdiction. A new regime for service of documents on directors was introduced and was intended to have a wide effect. It is not prima facie unfair that a director of an English company who resides abroad, but who gives an address for service in England, should be vulnerable to being served at that address as a choice, or a deemed choice, has been made. And the solution is simple because the director can opt to provide an address abroad in appropriate circumstances.
    1. In Mr Clarke’s submission, this reasoning it is not consistent with the analysis of the authorities by Warren J in Clavis Liberty Fun I LP v Revenue & Customs Commissioners[43], which was adopted by Teare J in Libyan Investment Authority v SGA Société Général[44]. In those two cases, both of which were concerned with witness summonses, Warren J and Teare J accepted as authoritative the following statement of principle by Stanley Burnton LJ in SSL International[45]:
It is a general principle of the common law that, absent a specific provision, as in the rules for service out of the jurisdiction, the courts only exercise jurisdiction against those subject to, i.e. within the jurisdiction.
and noted the approval by Stanley Burnton LJ of Lawrence Collins J’s dictum in Chellaram, “if read with that qualification” – that is, if the reference to persons “present in the jurisdiction” is read as meaning persons “subject to, ie within, the jurisdiction”.
    1. In Mr Clarke’s submission, the analysis of the authorities by Warren J in Clavis[46] shows that Master Marsh fell into error in relying on “the disapproval by the Court of Appeal in Kamali of the general principle enunciated by Lawrence Collins J in Chellaram“. Mr Clarke relies upon Warren J’s statement that he (like Master Marsh) was “clearly bound by” the explanation of Kamali given by the Court of Appeal in the later SSL International case, “even though there might be perceived a tension between the reasoning of May LJ (adopted by Wilson LJ) in [Kamali] and the reinstatement, if I can put it that way, [in SSL International] of the fundamental principle stated in Chellaram“.
    2. Like Master Marsh, Warren J and Teare J, I too am bound by the decision and reasoning of the Court of Appeal in SSL International. It seems to me that Mr Clarke is therefore right to say that Master Marsh should not have relied on the view expressed in Kamali by May LJ that “there is not, or at least no longer is, the fundamental principles such as Lawrence Collins J supposed”[47]. In my judgment, however, there is no tension between the actual decision in Key Homes and the common law principle that was re-stated by the Court of Appeal in SSL International.
    3. First of all, the re-statement of the principle by the Court of Appeal in SSL International expressly recognises that it can only apply “absent a specific provision”. Section 1140 is such a “specific provision”, and must be applied in accordance with its terms in order to give effect to its statutory purpose.
    4. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Court of Appeal’s re-statement of the principle (unlike the earlier formulation by Lawrence Collins J in Chellaram) makes it clear that what is required is that the person served should be “subject to” the jurisdiction. Actual physical presence at the moment of service is not necessary. As Teare J pointed out in his judgment in the Libyan Investment Authority case[48],
.. temporary absence while on holiday is no bar to service by first class post. It is also why the resident of North Cumbria whose trip across the border to Scotland for lunch has so engaged the attention of judges can also be served by first class post, notwithstanding that he is temporarily out of the jurisdiction ..
    1. Teare J was there speaking of persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court because they are resident within the jurisdiction, even though temporarily absent. However, there are many other ways in which persons can make themselves subject to the jurisdiction of the court, though not physically present here. One such way, provided for by s 1140, is to register a “service address” that is within the jurisdiction.
    2. As for Mr Clarke’s reliance upon s 1140(8), the answer to that submission was cogently provided by Master Marsh in his judgment[49]:
Section 1140(8) is explicable for the very reason that a director may opt to provide a service address which is outside the jurisdiction. Subsection (8) is designed to make clear that by providing a foreign address, a director is not agreeing that the English court will have jurisdiction to deal with any dispute concerning him. As the subsection makes clear, the general rule relating to permission for service outside the jurisdiction will still apply.
    1. Section 1140 was a new provision in company legislation, and was brought fully into force on 1 October 2009. In paragraph [13] of his judgment, Master Marsh quoted the DTI’s consultation paper on Company Law Reform dated March 2005 which, at paragraph 5.3, stated under the heading “Directors’ Home addresses”:
.. [I]t is important that the service address functions effectively, and the law will be tightened to increase the obligation on directors to keep the records up-to-date, and ensure that the address on the public record is fully effective for the service of documents ..
Master Marsh also quoted the commentary on clause 747 of the Bill (which eventually became s 1140 of the Act) as it was going through Parliament:
This clause is a new provision. It ensures that the address on the public record for any director or secretary is effective for the service of documents on that person. Sub-section (3) provides that the address is effective even if the document has no bearing on the person’s responsibilities as director or secretary.
    1. Master Marsh might also have referred to the following further provisions of the Companies Act 2006:
127.1 Section 163(1)(b), which requires that a company’s register of directors must contain (inter-alia) a “service address” for each director (and s167, which requires those particulars to be notified to the registrar);
127.2 Section 1142, which provides that:

Any obligation under the Companies Act to give a person’s address is, unless otherwise expressly provided, to give a service address for that person

127.3 Section 1141(1), which states that:

In the Companies Acts a “service address” in relation to a person means an address at which documents may be effectively served on that person

and to the Companies 2006 (Annual Return and Service Addresses) Regulations 2008[50], which specify that a “service address”:

.. Must be a place where (a) the service of documents can be affected by physical delivery; and (b) the delivery of documents is capable of being recorded by the obtaining of an acknowledgement of delivery.

  1. These materials, and the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in s 1140 itself, all show that the statutory intention was to have a definitive public record of the address at which the persons within this section could validly and effectively be served. That purpose would entirely be defeated if the validity of the address on the register depended upon the accident of whether the person concerned was physically present within the jurisdiction at the moment of service.
  2. A company director or secretary resident abroad is under no obligation to register an address for service that is within the jurisdiction. Mr Rahman could (and should, if he wished to avoid the jurisdiction of the English courts over him) have changed his registered address to his new address in Bangladesh when he ceased to be resident in England. He did not do so. His omission to do so meant that he remained subject to the jurisdiction of the English court, by virtue of having a registered service address that was within the jurisdiction.
  3. In my judgment, therefore, Mr Rahman was validly served at Morris Place, and his challenge to that service and to the exercise by the English court of jurisdiction over him on that basis must be dismissed.