NEW COUNTY COURT RULES: EXTENSION OF EQUITY JURISDICTION TO £350,000

March 12, 2014 · by gexall · in Civil Procedure, Members Content, Rule Changes, Useful links

On the 22nd April 2014 the County Court Equity jurisdiction is extended to £350,000. A copy of the relevant Statutory Instrument is attached uksi_20140503_en (1) and there is a link here....

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4 Responses

Dominic Cooper · March 13, 2014 at 11:45:18 · →

I note in the amendments to CPR Part 2 Practice Direction on allocation of cases to levels of judiciary, that ALL County Court DJs and CJs will now have jurisdiction to deal with ALL cases that may be heard in the County Court.

The rules, rather than talking of “jurisdiction” now refer to a case or application being “allocated to” a circuit judge or district judge as appropriate.

The significance being that “jurisdiction” is a matter of law whereas “allocation” is an administrative action, undertaken by the shadowy “court staff” with their secret letters and administrative diktats (as referred to in an earlier blog post of yours).

However, a new Paragraph 8.4 will be added to the practice direction, stating that an application for a Freezing Injunction will be allocated to a circuit judge in the County Court.

But unless I am mistaken (which I probably am) the County Court Remedies Regulations 1991 as amended will remain in force. And these regulations expressly prohibit a county court from granting such an injunction. Just another mistake, or have I missed something of significance? The reason I post is that I had expected the above regulations which you are quoting to make provision for the same and they do not.

Also I was very interested to see a reference to a County Court Limit for charging orders, being defined to be £5,000 for the purposes of section 1 of the Charging Orders Act 1979. So I looked at section 1 and sure enough it has a reference to the definition of the “County Court Limit” for the purposes of that section. But other than defining that limit, nowhere does that section of that enactment make any reference to or use of that limit! So a pointless statutory instrument varying a definition of a limit which is itself defined by primary legislation to be a limit which applies to a section of an act which does not apply nor use the limit!

Glad to see that the Law is being kept accessible and usable for people, so that we may readily understand it.
Marcus Flavin · March 13, 2014 at 15:32:47 · →

I think there is some meaning buried in the use of “freezing injunction” in the amended PD. The term is used to include a proprietary freezer over a specified fund the subject of the litigation, as well as a true freezer, ie a general freezer over all assets, or all to a specified limit, sought on the basis that there is a risk of dissipation and any judgment is likely to go unsatisfied. The white book (vol 2 at 15-54) is clearly of the view that the term in CPR 25.1(1)(f) means both. It shouldn’t because the test is different (and it’s supposed to be more difficult to justify a saving for legal expenses on the proprietary freezer) but there it is. A county court circuit judge (but not a DJ) always had jurisdiction to make a proprietary freezer (see para 3(3)(b) of the order you mention), presumably subject to the general equity limit (and I think a DJ has jurisdiction to make a Matrimonial Causes Act freezer, but the limit change seems timed to coincide with the creation of the unitary County Court and the distinct unitary Family Court, so that probably becomes academic)

There is a view that a Master in the High Court has jurisdiction to make an order under 25.1(1)(c)(i) for preservation of relevant property and an order for security over a relevant fund under CPR 25.1(1)(l), and that these are somehow distinct from but to the same effect as a proprietary freezer under 25.1(1)(f), which they can’t make, though the difference appears largely limited to whether or not there’s a penal notice on the face of the order. Some masters have been convinced, others have not.

re the charging orders thing, god alone knows. Presumably at some point the statute contained a reference to the limit which has now gone, but it doesn’t roll back that far on westlaw and someone seems to have consigned our crown printers edns to the outer darkness.

I live in forlorn hope of the coming of the “Administration of Justice (Consolidation and Simplification) Act…
Dominic Cooper · March 13, 2014 at 15:55:57 · →

Yes, last year I had a Recorder in the Plymouth County Court grant a freezing injunction against the PRs of an estate in 1975 Act claim for whom I acted. The application stated it was a freezing injunction (although not supported by affidavit) and the draft order clearly the same.

We obviously jumped up and down. Recorder granted it and said that it was “an injunction to retrain payments of sums in the capacity of executor of the will pending trial.” Therefore it was not a freezing injunction. I wasn’t convinced then, and I am still not now. But he granted it, and that was that!
Marcus Flavin · March 13, 2014 at 16:14:26 · →

Sounds doubtful to me, a 75 Act claim is not properly concerned with title to a fund (unless there’s a proprietary claim as well) so I’d have thought it can only be a pure freezer.

Amusingly I have just found myself completely confused on whether the new Act leaves any probate jurisdiction with the County Court at all, let alone increases it as one might expect.

The jurisdiction was in section 32, as opposed to the equity jurisdiction, and referred to the usual limit (per value of the estate as usual, so rarely going to be used in anything involving lawyers). That section goes entirely under Schedule 9 Part 1 10(3) of the new act. So far so good, if surprising.

But Schedule 9 Part 1 10(32) envisages, so far as I can make out, that there will still be appeals from the County Court on ““proceedings in respect of any contentious matter arising with any grant, or revocation, of probate or administration that under section 105 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 has been applied for through the principal registry of the Family Division or a district probate registry”

Meanwhile the new PD cheerfully amends PD 57 para 2.2, thus also assuming there will still be probate jurisdiction. Unless they are envisaging that cases will always start in the High Court but will regularly be thrown to the County Court by transfer under section 40.

I am utterly lost.