The decision of Mr Justice Bean in Dil -v- Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 2184 (QB)  relates to a police force’s obligations in relation to the disclosure of details of undercover operations and informers.  However it also deals with an important aspect of the law of pleadings.  A defendant can not, and should not, simply plead a bare “denial”. This is one of the rules most often breached.

“One of the most important recommendations made by Lord Woolf in his Access to Justice report in 1996 was that pleadings should not be technical documents, and in particular that “the Defence will set out the defendant’s detailed response to the claim and make clear the real issues between the parties”


The difference between a non-admission and denial was brought home in a talk by one of our local circuit judges, several decades ago now.  He was not backward in criticising the state of many of the pleadings that came before him.

  • Particulars of claim which, in a road traffic accident, gave no clue at all about how the accident occurred, but which were obsessed with identifying the cars (The 3.1, Mark 2, Ford Popular (2nd edition), GTI registration number BC 123G.)
  • He was annoyed with incompetent claimant pleading, however most of his ire was placed on defendants who did not know the difference between a non-admission and a denial.
  • His view that a a “denial” was  often placed in a defence to give an appearance of variety, with no thought to its consequences or because the defendant wanted to make it clear “we really don’t like that”.
  • The difference, however, is of some importance.




One of the express aims of the Woolf reforms was to end the “blanket denial.” A defendant could not simply “deny” everything. This is made clear CPR 16.

“16.5 (1) In his defence, the defendant must state –
(a) which of the allegations in the particulars of claim he denies;
(b) which allegations he is unable to admit or deny, but which he requires the claimant to prove; and (c) which allegations he admits.
(2) Where the defendant denies an allegation –
(a) he must state his reasons for doing so; and
(b) if he intends to put forward a different version of events from that given by the claimant, he must state his own version.”


In the Dil case the claimants brought a case alleging that the defendant had acted unlawfully in allowing undercover police officers to enter into sexual relationships with environmental campaigners.  The defendant denied the allegations but the defence was uninformative.

The pleaded Defence
  1. The Defence says very little about what the defendant’s case would be at a trial. It includes the following:-
“3. As the claimants know, the defendant’s policy is neither to confirm nor deny (“NCND”) allegations concerning undercover police operations.

4. The purpose of the NCND policy is to protect undercover officers and to uphold the effectiveness of operations and the prevention and detection of crime. The NCND policy must be adhered to if it is to have its intended protective effects.

5. The defendant adopts and applies that policy in relation to the factual allegations made by the claimants in these proceedings.

6. It is neither confirmed nor denied that the individuals mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Particulars of Claim were police officers; that (even if they were police officers) they served with the Metropolitan Police Service; that they were part of the Special Demonstration Squad; that they ever used a false identity; or that they took part in any intimate or sexual relationship with any of the claimants.

7. In any event, it is denied that the defendant is liable for the actions complained of for the further reasons set out below.”

  1. The defence then goes on to deal with (or, it might be said, not deal with) the individual cases. In answer to the claims of DIL and Helen Steel there is a detailed plea raising limitation, and in DIL’s case an allegation that the defendant is not liable because on her own case DIL continued her relationship with “Jim Sutton” even after he had disclosed his true identity to her in 2001 (a plea which lawyers have traditionally labelledvolenti non fit iniuria). With these exceptions, the pleading in the individual cases is entirely opaque. An example is in the case of RAB, described as the Sixth Claimant, where the Defence reads:-

“15. As set out above, the Sixth Claimant’s allegations about “Mark Cassidy” are neither confirmed nor denied.

16. Save as aforesaid, the Sixth Claimant is required to prove the matters set out at 34-45 of the Particulars of Claim.

17. For the reasons set out below it is denied in any event that the Defendant is liable for the torts of deceit, misfeasance, assault/battery or negligence (or at all).”

  1. The Defence goes on to plead that the claimants’ allegations “in so far as they relate to the SDS or the alleged actions of alleged undercover officers are neither confirmed nor denied”. As to the causes of action relied on by the claimants: it is denied that the acts alleged constituted the tort of deceit; in respect of the claim in assault or battery it is argued that, if the claimants voluntarily engaged in sexual activity with individuals who had lied about their identities and occupations, consent would not as a matter of law have been vitiated by such alleged deception; and in answer to the claim in negligence the existence of a duty of care is disputed.
  1. As to the claim alleging misfeasance in public office, the Defence states:-

“29. The allegation that officers of the Defendant expressly authorised or tacitly acquiesced in the formation of the sexual relationships alleged by the Claimants is neither confirmed nor denied.

30. The Claimants are required to prove that officers of the Defendant (a) acted unlawfully and (b) acted with malice, or knew that the unlawful acts (or any of them) would probably injure the Claimants. The Claimants are required to prove, in particular, that:

30.1 officers foresaw that the Claimants would be damaged by a sexual relationship and/or were recklessly indifferent to the risk of such damage.

30.2 officers knew that it was unlawful for undercover officers to enter into intimate sexual relationships with individuals, and/or were recklessly indifferent as to whether it was unlawful for them to do so.”
  1. For the claimants Phillippa Kaufmann QC submits that a defendant is only “unable” to confirm or deny the truth of an allegation if he does not know whether it is true or not. I accept that this is by far the most common reason for an inability to plead to an allegation, but I do not consider that the rules should be interpreted in such a literal way. As Ms Carss-Frisk points out, Lord Woolf’s original proposal was that a defendant should only be permitted neither to admit nor deny an allegation where the reason was because he did not know whether or not it was true; but that restrictive wording does not appear in CPR 16.5(1).
  1. In any event, there must be cases in which a defendant can properly refuse on policy grounds either to admit or to deny a pleaded allegation the truth of which he knows perfectly well. Suppose an individual is charged with possession of Class A drugs with intent to supply following a  police  raid on his home. Wishing to know the identity of the informant who told the  police  about his activities, he brings a civil claim against the  police  and alleges that the informer is his neighbour across the road. The defendant Chief Constable is able to confirm or deny that allegation but declines to do either, relying on the NCND principle. He would, on those facts, be entitled to do so.”

But note the very limited public interest limitation.


“One of the most important recommendations made by Lord Woolf in his Access to Justice report in 1996 was that pleadings should not be technical documents, and in particular that “the Defence will set out the defendant’s detailed response to the claim and make clear the real issues between the parties”


The issue in the Dil case was whether the defendant could merely plead a “cannot deny or confirm” defence to the allegations made. The defendant contended that the public interest in protecting the identity of informers meant that he was entitled to plead the action in an “opaque” manner.


  1. “I derive the following guidance from the authorities:
(1) There is a very strong public interest in protecting the anonymity of informers, and similarly of undercover officers (UCOs), and thus of permitting them and their superiors neither to confirm nor deny their status; but it is for the court to balance the public interest in the NCND policy against any other competing public interests which may be applicable (McNally; Mohamed and CF v SSHD).
(2) There is a well-established exception in a criminal trial where revealing the identity of the informer or the UCO is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice (Marks v Beyfus; R v Agar): this does not arise in the present case.
(3) Even where an individual informant or UCO has self-disclosed, the police (or the Secretary of State) may nevertheless be permitted to rely on NCND in respect of allegations in the case where to admit or deny them might endanger other people, hamper police investigations, assist criminals, or reveal police operational methods. (Savage; Carnduff).
  1. I will deal first with the general allegation and then with the specific ones. The general allegation is that officers of the MPS, as part of their work as undercover officers and using false identities, engaged in long term intimate sexual relationships with those whose activities the MPS wished to observe; and (although it will no doubt be a matter for legal argument at trial how significant this issue is) that this was authorised or acquiesced in by senior management.
  1. I do not accept that there is now, in 2014, any legitimate public interest entitling the Commissioner to maintain the stance of NCND in respect of this general allegation. The claims relate to alleged activities of officers of the SDS prior to its disbandment in 2008. It is not suggested that the use of long term sexual relationships of this kind as a police tactic is continuing. It is also not argued that it would be appropriate now, nor that (if it did occur) it was appropriate then. The Chief Constable conducting the Operation Herne investigation has expressed in trenchant terms the view that if this did happen it was a “gross abuse”: I believe that most people would agree with him. Whether the facts set out by the claimants, if proved, establish one or more of the pleaded causes of action as a matter of law is of course a different issue, and a matter for argument at the trial.
  1. One of the justifications for NCND is that police operational methods should not be revealed. This is in my view clearly intended to apply to operational methods which continue to be in use or are likely to be used in future. Moreover, just as (in the well-known words of Page Wood V-C in Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 L.J.Ch 113) “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity”, so there can be no public policy reason to permit the police neither to confirm nor deny whether an illegitimate or arguably illegitimate operational method has been used as a tactic in the past.
  1. I therefore rule that the defendant cannot rely on NCND to avoid answering the general allegation to which I have referred above..
  1. I turn to the specific allegations that the individual men with whom the Claimants had relationships were undercover officers. All have been publicly named in the media. Some have also self-disclosed; some have been the subject of official confirmation. Self-disclosure is relevant, but it does not have the same significance as official confirmation by the police force concerned, HMIC, a Minister or a court. Mr Creedon, in commenting on the self-disclosure by Peter Francis, declined to confirm or deny whether he had ever been an undercover police officer. He wrote:
“To avoid placing any individual in danger, this [NCND] principle is paramount. To comment either way would raise clear inferences in other cases where no comment can be made. This position is essential to ensure that danger and additional risk can be avoided.”
  1. “Jim Sutton” has been publicly named as an UCO by the Commissioner in person. (Commander Martin evidently regards this as a mistake, but he is not the defendant in this claim.) In the two cases involving him, reliance on the NCND policy to avoid admitting that he was an UCO is simply unsustainable.
  1. In the case of “Bob Robinson” I also consider that NCND can no longer be relied on. He has not only self-disclosed (using his real name of Bob Lambert), but has been publicly named by the IPCC as a former MPS officer; and he is no longer in the police service.
  1. However, in the cases of “Mark Cassidy” and “John Barker” I take a different view. Neither of them has self-disclosed nor been officially named as an undercover officer, although each has been named publicly in a variety of media (with a photograph of each man in the Guardian). In those circumstances I consider that the Commissioner should not be required to admit or deny whether either of them is an undercover officer or has the real name alleged. This may only postpone the day of reckoning, in the sense that if the case proceeds and no evidence is adduced to challenge that put forward by RAB and Helen Steel respectively, it appears likely that the respective factual cases put forward by them will be accepted. As I have already noted, the consequences of that in law would be a matter for argument in due course.
In accordance with the procedure envisaged in the order of Tugendhat J, the Commissioner will have 28 days from the handing down of this judgment in which to amend his Defence in order either to admit or deny that: (a) officers of the MPS, as part of their work as undercover officers and using false identities, engaged in long term intimate sexual relationships with those whose activities the MPS wished to observe; (b) this was authorised or acquiesced in by senior management; (c) “Jim Sutton” was such an officer; and (d) “Bob Robinson” was such an officer. The time for disclosure of documents, which was to have expired on the second day of the hearing before me, will be extended until 56 days from the handing down of judgment.”
The judge rejected an argument that a failure to fully plead the case should lead to the defence being struck out. Rather, if the defendant failed to plead a fully particularised case within the time specified he was to be taken to admit them.


The facts of Dil are unusual.  However there are important lessons in the case for all litigators.

  • The pleading of an “opaque” defence is justifiable only in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
  • A failure to fully plead a case can lead to an inference that the allegations are being admitted.
  • A “denial” is a much more dangerous thing to plead than a non-admission.
  • If a denial is pleaded the reasons for the denial, and any alternative case, must be pleaded.


Bare denials are still, in my experience, set out in defences. These defences are begging for an application to be struck out or an application for summary judgment.  However in the post-Denton world, where we are urged to avoid interlocutory wrangling, the most apposite response may well be a well-phrased Part 18 request.    For instance in fatal cases a defendant will often “deny” that a claimant is a dependant and never bother to file a counter-schedule.
“1. In paragraph 3 and 7 of the Defence it is “denied” that the claimant is or was a dependant of the deceased for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
The Defence does not comply with the rules of court. CPR 16.5(2) states that where a defendant denies an allegation “he must state his reason for doing so”.
Kindly comply with the rules of court.
(1)   State, with that particularity that will enable the Claimant to know the case she will have to meet at trial, why the Defendant denies the Claimant was a dependant.
(2)   CPR 16.5(2)(b) requires a defendant to “state its own version” of events if it is to put forward a different version of events. If the Defendant is denying the Claimant’s claim then comply with the rules of court and state, with full particularity, the version of events that the Defendant will put forward in support of its assertion that the Claimant is not a dependant.
At paragraph 9 of the Defence the Defendant “denies” the claim for financial and non financial dependency contained within the Claimant’s Schedule of Loss.
(1) Yet again the Defendant fails to comply with the rules of court.
(i)         State, with full particularity, why the claim for financial dependency is denied.
(ii)        State whether, if the Claimant establishes he is a dependant, the Defendant admits the claim as pleaded in full.
(2)       If the claim in the Schedule is not admitted in full state, with full particularity why the Defendant has felt it is able to ignore the provisions of the rules, in particular PD 16,12.2 and file a counter schedule.
(For the avoidance of doubt the Claimant will argue, at the trial of this action, that the Defendant’s failure to comply with the rules, to plead the Defence fully and to file a counter-schedule, means that the Defendant requires relief from sanctions if it is going to seek to challenge the Claimant’s case on damages. On the Defendant’s case as pleaded it is not open to the Defendant to adduce any positive case at trial. Further the Defendant is not able to challenge the items in the Schedule).”

Any defendant who ignores  and turns up at trial hoping to argue dependency and damages  cannot argue that they had not been warned.