A CLAIMANT’S ADDRESS SHOULD BE ON THE CLAIM FORM: BUT A FAILURE DOES NOT LEAD TO A GRANT OF SECURITY FOR COSTS

January 6, 2021 · by · in Applications, Civil Procedure

The judgment of Master Kaye in Beriwala v Woodstone Properties (Birmingham) Ltd & Anor [2021] EWHC 6 (Ch) provides a reminder that the inclusion of the claimant’s address on the claim form is a mandatory requirement [unless an application is made not to disclosure that address].  A failure to put the address on the claim form is a breach of the rules, however it did not justify the court making an award for security for costs.

“The requirement to state the claimant’s address in the claim form is a requirement of the rules, and not a mere practice direction.”

THE CASE

The defendants applied for security for costs against the claimant.  One of the grounds of the application was the claimant’s failure to put her full address on the claim form.

THE JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE

The Master rejected the defendants’ arguments under this issue.

    1. The Claim Form issued in September 2019 does not include NB’s apartment number only the address of the apartment block she lives in. CPR 16.2(1)(d) and PD16.2.2 requires the claimant to provide an address at which she resided even if her address for service was that of her solicitor.
    2. KDP sets out why he says the omission was deliberate including relying on evidence from prior to the issue of the proceedings to demonstrate that NB had been using her former address after she had moved. He relies on evidence of her previous address being used in relation to another creditor.
    3. NB acknowledges that the omission of the apartment number was deliberate. She says this was due to concerns about her safety and security following threats made to her and her family when they were at the previous address in 2017. She provides details of the nature of those threats.
    4. On 16 June 2020, 9-months after the issue of the claim, KDP wrote to GN raising concerns about NB’s incomplete address. NB instructed GN to provide the full address to KDP but on condition that it would remain confidential to the Defendants.
    5. KDP suggests that the address provided on that basis cannot be used for enforcement purposes and consequently NB was still in breach of CPR16. NB says that was not what was intended. Rather than seek to resolve this concern with GN or NB, the Defendants’ application was issued.
    6. In Stunt v Associated Newspapers[2019] EWHC 511 (QB) (“Stunt“) at [17] Mr Justice Warby having reviewed the requirements of CPR16 and the factual position in Stunt set out the position as follows:
“…I am not at all sure that it is fair to say that the defendant’s lawyers have known the right addresses throughout given the state of the evidence about what the residential address was. In any event, the requirement of the rule is not that the opponent’s lawyers should know the right addresses but that they should be stated in the claim form. On a proper analysis, I believe that Mr Higginson’s real argument is not that the rule was complied with but rather that there has been nothing but a technical breach, of which Associated is making far too much of a meal. I shall have to consider that issue when it comes to discretion, but the fact remains – and in reality it is undeniable – that when it was issued the claim form did not include any residential or business address of Mr Stunt. That is a contravention of Part 16 and its Practice Direction.
    1. Mr Patel accepted that in light of CPR16 and Stunt that the argument in relation to this threshold condition was about discretion. He argued that the nature ,extent and reasons for the omission would be highly relevant to the exercise of discretion.
    2. It is clear from the authorities and as a matter of principle that the question of discretion should be considered in relation to each threshold condition separately.
    3. In Stunt [47] Mr Justice Warby sets out difficulties that had arisen or might arise in relation to the absence of the provision of an address for service. In Stunt for example it had proved difficult to contact or serve the Claimant. No such difficulties arose in this case. Nonetheless he concluded at [47]
“All this said, I do not believe that I would have granted an order for security as a matter of discretion on the basis of this sub-rule.”
    1. Here the position is far less stark than the position in Stunt. The address provided on the particulars of claim includes the apartment number although Mr Randall submits that that does not resolve the technical breach of CPR25.13(2)(e) or CPR16. However, from September 2019 when the claim form and particulars of claim were served the Defendants had the full address including the apartment number. When NB was asked for the full address in June 2020 it was provided at the first time of asking. I do not accept the argument that the condition of confidentiality in relation to third parties that NB sought to impose was one that negated the provision of the address. And in any event the full address was in the particulars of claim. There were, on NB’s case, good reasons for not putting the full address on the claim form, albeit that the redaction of the address against third parties might have been approached in a different way from the outset. The approach adopted of simply not including the apartment number did not seem to me to particularly assist NB.
    2. There is a factual dispute, which I cannot resolve on this application, about whether in fact JK or the Defendants or their solicitors may have in fact known NB’s current address from other sources. That does not seem to me to resolve the CPR16 issue but would be considered as part of the exercise of discretion.
    3. The Defendants argue that NB was deliberately being evasive about her current address after moving in February 2019, but the evidence does not suggest that was as against these Defendants in any event. As I note the Claim Form issued on 20 September 2019 included the current address of NB other than the apartment number and the full address was included in the particulars of claim.
    4. KDP’s evidence that NB continued to use her previous address appears to primarily relate to a period in about February 2019 – the month in which she moved. The other evidence relied of evasiveness in relation to NB’s address is focussed on her use of what appears to be the registered office address of a company of which she was a director. NB provides an explanation for this in her evidence. However, the events in February 2019 on which the Defendants rely were not directed at the Defendants and appear to substantially pre-date the service of these proceedings. NB’s use of her previous address in February 2019 does not to my mind support any argument that she was deliberately concealing her address or being evasive about her address as against these Defendants in the circumstances of this case.
    5. The parties were both represented throughout the pre-action phase and there was no confusion or complication about service as a result of the missing apartment number which as I say was on the particulars of claim in any event.
    6. The Defendants did not raise their concern about the technical breach for 9-months and it presented no difficulties in the conduct of the claim and counterclaim.
    7. In Ruprah v Ruprah [2007] EWHC 3308 (Ch) at [19] Nicholas Strauss QC sitting as a Deputy Judge again on the facts of that case did not exercise his discretion to grant security for costs based on the failure to provide the correct address.
“The requirement to state the claimant’s address in the claim form is a requirement of the rules, and not a mere practice direction. In any event, the claimants’ request for Sohan’s address was not put on the basis of the practice direction. The claimants’ solicitors merely asked for his address, to which Sohan’s solicitors replied that the claimants already knew it. There is some material in the evidence that suggests that this may have been so, and in any event the address has now been given in Sohan’s witness statement, backed up by supporting documentation. In these circumstances, even if I had taken a different view on the construction of the rules, I would not have exercised my discretion to order security on this ground.
  1. It would be rare for the court to make an order for security for costs against an individual based in England and Wales without more. For the court to make an order for security for costs it must be satisfied that it is just in all the circumstances which is the exercise of a broad discretion. I have considered all the circumstances in relation to the breach of CPR16. Whilst the omission of the apartment number on the Claim Form amounts to a technical breach of CPR16 it is a minor breach in the context of this case. Even on the Claim Form the entire address other than the apartment number was given and the full address was on the particulars of claim. It took 9-months for KDP to ask for the address. It did not preclude the Defendants from fully participating in the proceedings or pursuing their defence. The Defendants’ evidence is not compelling. I simply do not accept that as against the Defendants there was any prejudice caused by the missing apartment number on the claim form.
  2. To my mind although there was a breach of CPR 16 this is not a case in which as a matter of discretion it would be just to order security for costs on this ground and I do not do so.
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