CASE MANAGEMENT ORDERS ARE NOT WRITTEN IN STONE: COURT SHOULD NOT BE “STUCK IN THE RAILS”: MASTER COULD VARY ORDER OF PREVIOUS MASTER

March 9, 2021 · by · in Appeals, Applications, Case Management

In  Oyston & Anor v Rubin & Anor [2021] EWHC 448 (Ch) Mr Justice Miles considered arguments in relation to whether a Master was entitled to vary a previous order made by a different Master.   The judge emphasised that case management direction were not “rigid tramlines” and the court was entitled to consider wider factors when varying case management decisions when there was no prejudice to the parties.

“… the general rules about changes of circumstances (or decisions being made on the basis of a misunderstanding or mistake) should not be regarded as rigid tramlines and, in the end, the governing question is whether it is just to revisit an earlier decision. In making a decision about the allocation of judicial resources, I do not see why the court should be stuck in the rails of earlier decisions. Of course, if new decision might involve some material prejudice to the parties, that is something that would have to be given full and proper weight, but there was nothing of that kind here.”

 

THE CASE

The claimants issue proceedings challenging the final account of receivers.  A Deputy Master dealt with an application on papers and directed that the matter be heard by a Master.  At a subsequent hearing a different Master allocated the hearing to a High Court Judge who was extremely familiar with the matter.

THE CLAIMANTS’ APPEAL

The claimants appealed the decision that the matter should be heard by a judge. The main argument that the Master had no jurisdiction to overturn the previous decision.  This argument was considered and rejected by Mr Justice Bell.

    1. At the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellants made it clear that his appeal was really based on one point, which was whether the Master had jurisdiction properly to revisit the order of the Deputy Master. He said that there was no justification for upsetting that decision and that, therefore, the matter should be heard by a master, as the Deputy Master had ordered. He accepted that it would, as he put it, be very difficult for the appellants to succeed on the other grounds, which essentially involved a challenge to a case management decision and the exercise of an evaluative discretion by the Master.
    1. Before turning to the detailed arguments, it seems to me there is a key overarching consideration. In managing cases, the court must take account of the use of judicial resources and the needs of all litigants, not merely those before the court. The efficient allocation of judges or masters to cases is part of effective and fair administration of justice. The court itself has a strong interest in allocating resources efficiently. It must, of course, do so fairly and avoid unnecessary chopping and changing, but if a judge or master has been involved in a case it will often make sense to allocate further aspects of that case to him or her. The Master said that the decision in the present case is on the cusp of case management and court administration and I consider that is apt. However, in my view, it is particularly important here to emphasise the court administration aspect. The court has its own interest in the efficient use of judicial resources and is entitled to make its decisions about how best to deploy them.
  1. With this in mind, I turn to the issue raised by the appellants: did the Master have power to set aside the order of the Deputy Master?

NO NEED FOR A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The judge rejected the claimants’ argument that there had been no change of circumstances that justified varying the order. However, in any event, it was doubtful that a change of circumstances was required.

    1. I add this. I have addressed the question on the footing that a change of circumstances was required to justify Master Clarke revisiting the allocation of the case to a master and making the revised allocation order that she did. But I doubt that in a case of this kind a material change of circumstances was in fact necessary to arm the court with the power to make a revised decision of the kind it did. I have already explained that the court has its own interest in the allocation of judicial resources. To my mind, it is always open to the court, of its own motion, to make such decisions, even where this may involve a change to an earlier order. An example of this is a decision of the court to docket a case to a particular judge. Indeed, shortly after the Master’s order the Chancellor docketed this case to Marcus Smith J. There would be nothing, it seems to me, in the order of the Deputy Master that could have prevented that happening.

      As the Court of Appeal explained in Tibbles, the general rules about changes of circumstances (or decisions being made on the basis of a misunderstanding or mistake) should not be regarded as rigid tramlines and, in the end, the governing question is whether it is just to revisit an earlier decision. In making a decision about the allocation of judicial resources, I do not see why the court should be stuck in the rails of earlier decisions. Of course, if new decision might involve some material prejudice to the parties, that is something that would have to be given full and proper weight, but there was nothing of that kind here.

 

 

  1. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
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