A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR LITIGANTS: CLAIMANT ORDERED TO PAY £17,500 IN COSTS IN A SMALL CLAIMS TRACK CASE
I am grateful to barrister Ashley Blood-Halvorsen for bringing my attention to the judgment of District Judge Lumb in Reed -v- Boswell (06/12/2022) a copy of which is available here. It is a rare example of costs being awarded against a losing party in a Small Claims Track case. (Ashley has written on the topic and, with her permission, her article is reproduced below. It contains an explanation of the order for costs that is not covered by the judgment).
“This small claim is a cautionary tale for litigants in person who consider that they have been wronged by another person and, perhaps encouraged by a popular perception that the Small Claims Court is an easy way to seek redress, launch into court proceedings without specialist guidance or a proper understanding of what may be required to enable the court to determine the matter.”
The claimant was a landlord of a flat. She allegedly obtained a favourable reference about a tenant from the defendant, also a landlord. The tenant took up a tenancy with the claimant and was a “disastrous” tenant. The claimant then issued proceedings against the defendant, claiming damages on the basis that the tenancy would not have been entered into if the reference had not been given.
THE INADEQUATE PLEADING OF THE CLAIMANT’S CASE
The judge raised concerns about the nature of the way in which the claimant’s case was put.
10. At the outset of the trial, I expressed my concern to the parties about the way in which the Claimants claim had been pleaded. The brief details of the claim at the start of the claim form and the particulars of claim endorsed on the claim form running to only 5 lines can be set out in full as follows;
“brief details of claim
Mr C S Boswell knowingly made an untrue statement of fact which induced Mrs L Reid to
enter into a contract with Mr M Fernandes from which contract she suffered financial
Particulars of Claim
Mr C S Boswell gave Mrs L Reid a favourable reference and a sum of money purporting to be
a deposit relating to Mr M Fernandes knowing it to be false and which induced her to give
Mr Fernandes possession of Flat 61 Spencer Avenue Yarnton 0X5 1NQ and which resulted
in substantial financial damage to her. Such financial damage was reasonably foreseeable by
Mr Boswell given his poor experience with Mr Fernandes as a tenant of Mr Boswell ‘s flat at
364 Banbury Road 0X2 7PP.”
11. These scant particulars are wholly insufficient, they do not even specify the cause of action giving rise to the claim as a matter of law and it is regrettable that at the allocation hearing at the outset of this matter they were not struck out and the Claimant required to file full and proper particulars of claim in compliance with paragraph 8.2 of the
Practice Direction to CPR Part 16.
THE KEY FINDINGS
There were hundreds of pages of evidence, three expert reports on phones (only one of which was admissible as expert evidence).
The burden of proof lay on the claimant . The claim was inadequately pleaded. However the defendant assumed it was in deceit.
28. I also accept the account given by the Defendant in relation to the disputed text messages. The Claimant has maintained throughout an almost obsessional assertion that the disputed text messages were never sent to her and were “ghosted” onto the Defendant’s mobile phone before it was examined by the single joint expert. The evidence of that expert simply does not support this assertion.
29. A possible explanation as to why the Claimant could not find the text messages on her own phone may be that they were initially moved into a spam folder and then automatically deleted before she read them.
30. The court has to decide the issues in the case on the basis of the evidence. The expert evidence quite simply does not support the Claimant’s case. For that reason, I find that the Defendant’s account is more likely than not to be the correct one. The Claimant’s case is inherently unlikely in the absence of clear corroborative evidence to support her
assertions. There is no such corroborative evidence.
31. The Claimant invites the court to accept her case that the statement of a favourable reference was made by the Defendant to her by effectively saying that her word should be preferred to that of the Defendant as she is a woman of impeccable character being a solicitor of many years standing who would not dream of lying.
32. I do not find that the Claimant is lying about the reference. I do, however, find that she is mistaken about it and has assumed that in some way the Defendant led her to believe that Mr Fernandes was a good tenant. Perhaps her pride has caused her to convince herself that she could not have been mistaken and that there was no need for her to carry
out other checks as to the suitability of Mr Fernandes?
33. The Claimant as a solicitor with considerable experience in the criminal law will fully appreciate the importance of the best evidence being produced to the court and for the desirability for there to be corroborating evidence. The best evidence of a reference would have been to have requested a written reference as this makes the contents of any representation so much easier to prove. I am sure that in hindsight she wishes that she had obtained a written reference which would have been the prudent thing for any prospective landlord to do. In addition to this, a prudent landlord would have sought an employer’s reference and required proof of income. The Claimant did none of these things. Her explanation that she thought the Defendant was a local businessman of good standing when she did not know him personally, is, I am afraid, a rather weak
explanation as to why she failed to make proper and comprehensive checks.
FAILING TO PROVE LOSS
The judge found that the claimant had failed to establish that a reference had been given at all. Even it if had there was insufficient evidence to establish a loss.
Even if I had been wrong about my conclusions in relation to the making of the
statement, the Claimant would have struggled to prove any loss that have been caused
by any misrepresentation.
39. It was accepted by the Claimant in cross examination that for the first 3 months Mr
Fernandes had paid his rent earlier on time. The following 3 months he was late with
the rent but did eventually pay. Whilst ultimately he did not pay the rent and possession
proceedings were commenced this was so long after the tenancy of 61 Spencer Avenue
that this amounted to a break in the chain of causation in relation to him being unreliable
in his payment of rent.
40. In her original Claim Form and in parts of her evidence the Claimant appeared to be
asserting that the £875 deposit paid by the Defendant to the Claimant to carry over to
the Claimant’s new tenancy was not a deposit at all but was money that was due back
to Mr Fernandes. This is clearly a misunderstanding of the position on the part of the
Claimant. At the conclusion of the tenancy for 364 Banbury Road there was an
obligation to maintain the part of the deposit that would relate to the new tenancy of 61
Spencer Avenue and it was quite correct for the Defendant to pass this on to the
41. I accept the Defendant’s evidence about the timing of the post tenancy inspection and
that he had rued the fact that he had paid over the £875 to the Claimant when he could
have used it to defray the cost of the damage caused by Mr Fernandes to 364 Banbury
42. In any event, it is quite bizarre that the Claimant chose to pay £875 to Mr Fernandes
when he left 61 Spencer Avenue following the possession order when she was owed
rent. Her explanation that her experiences of working in the criminal law had meant
that she often adopted the role of a quasi-social worker may perhaps explain this but
that was a clear example of a failure on her part to mitigate her losses as was her failure
to look to Mr Fernandes for payment of damages in the first instance rather than
pursuing the Defendant.
43. The evidence with regard to the cost of the repairs to the flat was also extremely
unsatisfactory given invoices were raised from a company run by the Claimant’s partner
that was no longer trading and had not traded for a number of years and the invoices
were made out to a separate legal entity other than the Claimant herself and therefore
arguably were not her losses. It is also potentially telling that a copy of the tenancy
agreement with Mr Fernandes has never been produced by the Claimant and maybe this
is because the tenancy was in the name of a company controlled by the Claimant and
not in the name of the Claimant herself and therefore the losses were not truly hers.
This, I am afraid, is just a further example of how chaotic and disorganised this claim
44. In conclusion, the Claimant’s claim fails. I do not find that she has deliberately misled
the court but in many respects the claim was misconceived and unclear. It was
unreasonable to continue to run the argument with regard to the disputed text messages
given the findings of the single joint expert and there were aspects of the quantum of
damages claimed that were also inconsistent, unsupported and on the face of it, not
losses that were sustained by the Claimant herself.
Ashley has kindly given me permission to set out her own post on the case, which is available here. This makes it clear that the claimant was ordered to pay £17,500 in costs (out of £25,000 claimed).
Lee Reed v Carl Boswell (2022)
1. Consider the following: what track should these proceedings be allocated to?
(a) a claim brought on the basis of dishonesty and fraud;
(b) disputed text messages for which one party has claimed that the other manufactured
(c) three expert reports commissioned (only one actually having expert status at trial)
regarding the aforementioned disputed text messages;
(d) one and a half day trial with four witnesses cross-examined;
(e) written closing submissions running to 22 pages for the Defendant; and
(f) written reserved judgment handed down about 8 months after the final hearing.
2. A multi-track claim? Perhaps a fast-track on steroids? No this was a small claim heard in
the County Court sitting at Oxford. Judgment was given on 6 December 2022.
3. This is the tale of poor Mr Boswell which is a small claims matter that is worth sharing.
The author represented Mr Carl Boswell, the Defendant in a claim brought by Mrs Lee
Reed who is a criminal solicitor and acted in person. You can read the judgment here.
4. Of note in this matter is that the Defendant obtained a costs order of £17,500 (out of a
bill just shy of £25,000) against the Claimant which is rather unusual given its allocation
to the small claims track.
Basis of the Claim
5. Mrs Reed brought a claim against Mr Boswell alleging that he gave a ‘favourable’
reference for a prospective tenant called Mr Fernandes. Mr Fernandes was a tenant of
Mr Boswell occupying a flat above one of his businesses, a funeral home.
£17,500 Costs Order on the Small Claims Track: Poor Mr Boswell – by Ashley Blood-Halvorsen
13 January 2023
6. As it happened, Mr Boswell was an inexperienced residential landlord and busy local
businessman who delegated tasks to his staff. Mr Fernandes’ deposit was partially
released and paid directly to Mrs Reed before the checkout inspection of the funeral
home flat had occurred. This turned out to be a grave error.
7. During his occupation of the funeral home flat, there was a one-off issue of loud music
during business hours, a disagreement about the parking of his motor vehicle, an issue
about the dustbins and rubbish being left in communal arears. Mr Fernandes was not a
model tenant but most of the problems with him were not discovered until he vacated.
8. The tenant told Mr Boswell that he needed somewhere more affordable to live and Mrs
Reed’s property was cheaper.
9. Mr Fernandes vacated the flat before his first tenancy inspection and upon vacating the
premises it was discovered that he had caused damage to the flat and furnishings within
it. As well, Mr Fernandes was in rent arrears which was not picked up on possibly due to
turnover of administration staff at Mr Boswell’s company.
10. It was Mrs Reed’s case that the Defendant wanted Mr Fernandes out of the funeral
home flat because he was a troublesome tenant and wanted to dump him on Mrs Reed
instead. Mrs Reed asserted that Mr Boswell had telephoned her (which was denied
entirely by Mr Boswell) to give a ‘favorable’ reference for Mr Fernandes. On the basis of
this alleged oral reference and the payment of a deposit (forwarded from Mr Boswell’s
company), Mrs Reed allowed Mr Fernandes into her property.
11. Once Mr Fernandes had left the funeral home flat and a check out inventory was done,
Mr Boswell realised what sort of tenant Mr Fernandes was. It was his case that he
telephoned Mrs Reed (having obtained her contact details from another person) to warn
her about Mr Fernandes. Mr Boswell then emailed the Claimant the check out inventory
report which set out the extensive damage fully with photographs.
12. Thus, Mr Boswell’s case was that there was only one telephone call between the parties
(after Mr Fernandes had vacated his flat) whilst the Claimant said there were two
telephone calls (the first one giving an alleged ‘favourable’ reference and the second one
which Mr Boswell sought to warn Mrs Reed).
13. At this point there was an exchange of text messages which became the centre of a
hotly disputed point of fact between the parties which is expanded upon below.
14. During the course of the tenancy, Mrs Reed also had issues with Mr Fernandes.
However, he was not in rental arrears until about four months into the tenancy and
eventually she obtained a possession order on that basis. Bailiffs were sent in to remove
15. Mrs Reed’s property had been heavily damaged, and there was evidence that it was
used to manufacture illegal substances. Holes were cut in the ceiling; the electric meter
was tampered with amongst other destruction to the property. The loses were not
particularised in the claim form and became a point of contention for the Defendant.
16. Mrs Reed brought a claim against Mr Boswell claiming various unparticularised losses
including the costs of repairing her property and rental arrears amounting to £8,833.92.
The claim form was brief and contained the following:
Brief details of claim
Mr C.S.Boswell knowingly made an untrue statement of fact which induced Mrs L Reed
to enter into a contract with Mr M Fernandes from which contract she suffered financial
Particulars of claim
Mr C.S.Boswell gave Mrs L Reed a favourable reference and a sum of money purporting
to be a deposit relating to Mr M Fernandes knowing it to be false and which induced her
to give Mr Fernandes possession of Flat 61 Spencer Avenue, Yanton OX5 1NQ and
which resulted in substantial financial damage to her. Such financial damage was
reasonably foreseeable by Mr Boswell given his prior experience with Mr Fernandes as a
tenant of Mr Boswell’s flat at 364 Banbury road, OX27PP.
17. Mr Boswell initially acted in person and filed a ‘defence response’ to the claim. He then
retained Bower Bailey for legal representation who then in turn instructed the author.
18. The claim form did not identify a cause of action, and none was ever expressly
articulated by the Claimant, so it was assumed she was relying on the tort of deceit
which does not form part of the usual diet of a County Court judge.
19. A hotly disputed point of fact between the parties centered around the sending of various
text messages mentioned above. It was Mr Boswell’s case that they were sent to the Claimant, and it was the Claimant’s case that not only were these messages never
received (or even sent) the screen shots provided as evidence of the text messages
were fraudulent. According to Mrs Reed the text messages were concocted, a lie and Mr
Boswell was totally dishonest about them. She never waivered from this position even in
the face of the subsequent single joint expert’s evidence.
20. The disputed text messages were brief. They start with the Claimant giving Mr Boswell
her personal email address (presumably to receive the check out report) and then Mr
Boswell sending a lengthy reply expressing disappointment that Mr Fernandes had
crossed both of their paths. He then sought to try and recover some of Mr Fernandes’
deposit which was declined by Mrs Reed who wanted to hold onto it just in case she had
problems with him- which she ended up having.
21. As a side note, when the bailiffs removed Mr Fernandes from Mrs Reed’s property, she
returned the deposit in full to him despite him being in rent arrears and having caused
substantial damage her flat.
22. At the start of the final hearing in November 2021, District Judge Lumb expressed
concern about the lack of particularity in the claim form and also that the matter was
allocated to the small claims track. The Defendant’s skeleton argument contained
comprehensive submissions regarding the unsatisfactory nature of the Claimant’s
statement of case.
23. The court was directed to the ingredients for the tort of deceit as set out in Connolly v
Bellway Homes  All ER (D) 182. It was submitted that the particulars of claim were
totally defective because they failed to plead what the alleged misrepresentations or
statements were. A ‘favourable’ reference was not an alleged statement from Mr
Boswell. The court’s attention was then drawn to Practice Direction 16 paragraph 8.2.
24. It’s the author’s view that the court was sympathetic to these submissions, and it
appeared initially that District Judge Lumb was tempted to adjourn the hearing with
directions that the Claimant was to amend her particulars of claim. However, by this point
the final hearing had already been vacated for lack of judicial availability, there had been
3 application hearings for the expert evidence and there were numerous witnesses in
25. Frankly, both the Claimant and Defendant were in complete agreement that the matter
should proceed instead of being adjourned with directions. As such, the hearing went
ahead on the basis of the statements of case as they were.
26. Three witnesses for the Claimant were cross-examined. One other witness for the
Claimant attended but was not required for cross-examination. The Claimant had
produced one other witness statement which had limited value and the witness was not
in attendance. Rather unexpectedly (at least from the Defendant’s point of view) Mr
Fernandes himself was at the final hearing and gave oral evidence.
27. The first day of the final hearing concluded with the Claimant’s evidence leaving a half
day hearing for the Defendant’s cross-examination which occurred in April 2022.
28. Once the disputed text messages were disclosed to Mrs Reed she immediately denied
their validity and sought to obtain expert evidence to prove that. She wanted a single
joint expert to inspect both mobile phones. Mr Boswell initially declined on the basis that
it was not proportionate for a small claims matter. As such, Mrs Reed made the first
application for expert evidence to inspect the mobile phones.
29. The author was instructed to represent the Defendant at the hearing whose position was
that an expert should not be instructed because it was not proportionate but if one was to
be ordered then both mobile phones would be needed. The application hearing was
listed by telephone and unfortunately the court failed to call the author. As such, Mr
Boswell was not represented at that hearing.
30. The Deputy District Judge granted the Claimant’s application in part but only ordered that
the Claimant’s mobile was to be examined. He declined to order the Defendant’s mobile
also be examined which was disappointing. This led to an unsatisfactory and unhelpful
expert report (‘the Jackson Report’) because it was inconclusive having not examined
the Defendant’s mobile.
31. After receiving the Jackson Report, the Defendant sought his own expert and submitted
his phone for inspection (‘the Griffin Report’). The Griffin Report did find evidence text
messages being sent from Mr Boswell’s mobile to the Claimant’s which was contrary to
her position. The Griffin Report was disclosed to the Claimant who refused to accept it.
A further application was made to the court for a single join expert to examine both parties’
mobile phones in light of inconclusive and unhelpful nature of the Jackson Report.
32. The application was granted and the mobile phones from both parties were examined by
MD5 Ltd who then produced a comprehensive report. Some of the key takeaways from
the MD5 Ltd report were:
(a) that the disputed text messages were not found on Mrs Reed’s mobile but they were
found on Mr Boswell’s. The expert confirmed that the located messages were the
same that were found in the Griffin Report;
(b) that there was nothing to indicate that either mobile had been jailbroken or had Cydia
(or similar applications) previously installed. The expert also wrote ‘Relationships
identified within the within the “sms.db” appear consistent for the messages. This
does not appear to have been altered by the user. No other messages contained the
same chat ID.’ The significance of which meant ‘this indicates that no additional
messages have been inserted into the database and the numbers reflect each other’.
33. The conclusion of the MD5 Ltd heavily favoured the Defendant’s position over the
Claimant’s assertion that the disputed text messages were ‘fake’ and or were ‘ghosted in’
which in turn harmed her credibility.
34. District Judge Lumb opted to reserve judgment and delivered a written judgment on 6
December 2022. The claim was dismissed, and in the author’s opinion, the judgment
was critical of the Claimant. The starting paragraph acts as a warning:
1. This small claim is a cautionary tale for litigants in person who consider that they
have been wronged by another person and, perhaps encouraged by a popular
perception that the Small Claims Court is an easy way to seek redress, launch into
court proceedings without specialist guidance or a proper understanding of what may
be required to enable the court to determine the matter.
35. Regarding the disputed text messages, District Judge Lumb said the following:
28. I also accept the account given by the Defendant in relation to the disputed text
messages. The Claimant has maintained throughout an almost obsessional assertion
that the disputed text messages were never sent to her and were “ghosted” onto the
Defendant’s mobile phone before it was examined by the single joint expert. The
evidence of that expert simply does not support this assertion.
29. A possible explanation as to why the Claimant could not find the text messages
on her own phone may be that they were initially moved into a spam folder and then
automatically deleted before she read them.
30. The court has to decide the issues in the case on the basis of the evidence. The
expert evidence quite simply does not support the Claimant’s case. For that reason, I
find that the Defendant’s account is more likely than not to be the correct one. The
Claimant’s case is inherently unlikely in the absence of clear corroborative evidence
to support her assertions. There is no such corroborative evidence.
31. The Claimant invites the court to accept her case that the statement of a
favourable reference was made by the Defendant to her by effectively saying that her
word should be preferred to that of the Defendant as she is a woman of impeccable
character being a solicitor of many years standing who would not dream of lying.
36. Then regarding the conduct and basis of the claim itself:
43. The evidence with regard to the cost of the repairs to the flat was also extremely
unsatisfactory given invoices were raised from a company run by the Claimant’s
partner that was no longer trading and had not traded for a number of years and the
invoices were made out to a separate legal entity other than the Claimant herself and
therefore arguably were not her losses. It is also potentially telling that a copy of the
tenancy agreement with Mr Fernandes has never been produced by the Claimant
and maybe this is because the tenancy was in the name of a company controlled by
the Claimant and not in the name of the Claimant herself and therefore the losses
were not truly hers. This, I am afraid, is just a further example of how chaotic and
disorganised this claim has been.
44. In conclusion, the Claimant’s claim fails. I do not find that she has deliberately
misled the court but in many respects the claim was misconceived and unclear. It
was unreasonable to continue to run the argument with regard to the disputed text
messages given the findings of the single joint expert and there were aspects of the
quantum of damages claimed that were also inconsistent, unsupported and on the
face of it, not losses that were sustained by the Claimant herself.
£17,500 costs order
37. Most readers will be aware that costs on the small claims track are severely restricted
and subject to the fixed costs as set out in CPR 27.14. There are a couple of ways to
escape the fixed costs, one common method is by way of a contractual entitlement but
that was not applicable in this matter.
38. The only option was to make an application under CPR 27.14(2)(g) for unreasonable
behaviour. These applications rarely succeed because there is a high threshold to meet.
They are not wasted costs application, but they are akin. In Dammermann v Lanyon
Bowdler LLP  EWCA Civ 269 it was suggested that the wasted costs jurisdiction
was the ‘acid test’.
39. Importantly, if the court is minded to make an award, it is only the costs incurred because
of the unreasonable behaviour that are awarded. It is done by summary assessment and
applying a rough and ready broad-brush approach.
40. Unfortunately, the draft judgment was not emailed to the parties until the morning of the
hearing. Having read the judgment at court, the following 5 heads of submissions for a
CPR 27.14(2)(g) application were prepared:
(a) the Claimant brought a fundamentally defective claim and refused to amend her
particulars of claim;
(b) the Claimant continually referring to the disputed text messages as ‘fake’ and that
they were ‘ghosted in’ despite the position of the MD5 Ltd report and agreeing that
the expert’s report was a good one. As well, alleging that the Griffin Report itself was
a fraud and that there was some sort of collusion between Bower Bailey and that
(c) claiming that the solicitor for Mr Boswell was a witness to the Defendant’s case
(having prepared a witness statement for an interim application) and threatening,
more than once, to make a complaint to the SRA on that basis;
(d) continually ignoring the civil procedure rules and bringing a third witness statement
without permission and well out of time; and
(e) failing to accept an offer made by the Defendant and making a counteroffer which
was worth more than the value of the claim recorded on the claim form.
41. Out of the 5 heads, the fourth was the weakest and it would not be sufficient to make an
application on its own. It is frustrating when opposing parties, particularly litigants in
person, do not comply with the civil procedure rules. Often this causes an increase in
costs with limited hope of recovering the increased amounts.
42. Further, by virtue of CPR 27.14(3) a party’s rejection of an offer to settle the claim is not
unreasonable behaviour but it is a fact which can be taken into consideration when
applying the unreasonable test. In this matter, the Defendant made a
commercial/nuisance offer to the Claimant which was rejected by Mrs Reed.
43. Mrs Reed then made a counteroffer for £12,096.28 which was £2,807.36 more than what
she had initially claimed. This was rightfully refused by Mr Boswell.
44. District Judge Lumb fell short of making findings of dishonesty against the Claimant in
his judgment, but he did find that Mrs Reed had acted unreasonably for the purposes of
45. The judge was particularly troubled by the Claimant’s refusal to take remedial action
regarding her statement of case despite the numerous warnings, her allegations that the
Griffin Report itself was a fraud and that there was some sort of collusion between the
solicitors and that expert, the misunderstanding of a witness statement by a solicitor in
support of an interim application and the threats of reporting that solicitor to the SRA.
46. All these actions had the effect of significantly increasing the time expense and legal cost
payable by Mr Boswell.
47.As such, District Judge Lumb awarded £17,500 to the Defendant out of a total bill of
48. This is a County Court decision so is not binding and nor does it carry any real weight to
it. However, it is an interesting case and one worth sharing for those of us in the coalface
of the County Court. It is a useful reminder and warning to litigants in persons with legal
qualifications. You must follow the civil procedure rules and properly plead your claims.
There are cost risks, even on the small claims track if you fail to do that.
49. It is common knowledge that litigants in person are given a certain amount of judicial
patience that represented parties do not benefit from. The problem for Mrs Reed is that
she knew enough about the law to get herself into difficulties and then refused to correct
her shortcomings because of a general mistrust of her opponent. Frankly, if she had
listened and amended her particulars of claim when she was warned by Bower Bailey in
early correspondence she might not have been liable for the significant legal costs.
50. Bringing claims rooted in dishonesty and fraud is incredibly serious even on the small
claims track. Mr Boswell is a local businessman with an excellent reputation to defend. If
one is going to bring a claim for dishonesty, the particulars of claim must be drafted as
precisely as possible. The Claimant’s refusal to amend her particulars of claim was
ultimately her downfall. Her insistence that the reference was ‘favourable’ without
expanding on more was simply not good enough.
51. Details about what a ‘favourable’ reference meant only came to light during careful
cross-examination and consideration of her three witness statements. By then it was far
too late and that is reflected in the judgment of District Judge Lumb. You can read it here
if you have not already clicked the link.
52. If a legal representative is thinking about about making an application under CPR 27.14(2)(g),
having a bundle of correspondence evidencing the unreasonable behaviour is critical.
The bundle for the application was 56 pages having been pruned back from about 300
pages of inter-parties’ correspondence. It was a tedious task but worthwhile.
53. Identifying each head of unreasonableness, why the conduct was unreasonable and why
it increased the costs for the applicant significantly increases the chances of an order
being made under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
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