PERSONAL INJURY POINTS 3: A SOLICITOR INJURED AT WORK FAILS TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY: A DOOR IS NOT WORK EQUIPMENT
The question of what is work equipment can be a fairly fundamental one for personal injury lawyers. There can still be something akin to strict liability under the provisions of the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969. Here we consider the issue in relation to a tragic case where a young solicitor was seriously injured at work.
“Taking the meaning of the word “equipment” in widest sense, it is in my judgment a step too far to strain the interpretation of the words “equipment used for the purposes of” a solicitor’s business to include an ordinary door in a building.”
KEY PRACTICE POINTS
The most significant point here is for claimant and defendant personal injury lawyers to consider the limits of the term “work equipment”.
THE CASE
Chuhan v Dechert LLP HHJ Berkley, 11th April 2025. I am grateful to barrister Andrew McLaughlin for sending me a copy of the judgment which is available here. Chuhan v Dechert LLP Handed Down Judgment
THE FACTS
The claimant is a solicitor employed by the defendant firm. She was injured when the top of a door handle on a door at her workplace became detached as she pulled it. She suffered serious injuries and the claim was for a seven figure loss.
THE CLAIMANT’S CASE
The claimant’s case was that the door handle was defective in a number of ways. She brought her claim under the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, negligence was not relied upon.
THE DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT: THIS WAS NOT WORK EQUIPMENT
The defendant’s case was that this was not work equipment for the purposes of the Act and it had a proper and adequate system of maintenance for the handle.
THE JUDGE’S FINDINGS: A DOOR IS NOT WORK EQUIPMENT
The central finding was that a door was not work equipment.
“51. There are intrinsic difficulties with describing a plain and ordinary door used in an office building as “equipment”. It is not used in the course of a solicitor’s employment save as part of the building in which that solicitor is employed. The case of Davidson cited in Munkman at §4.76 and by Mr Grant (see above) is an authority relating to the scope of the common law of negligence with which this case is not concerned. Of course, the Door is part of the building from which the Defendant carries on its business, but it cannot really be said that the door is somehow part of the process of providing legal advice, cf. the legal texts in Munby, or a computer or telephone. I emphasise that this observation is made in the context of deciding whether the Door is “equipment” at all, rather than whether it is used in the course of its business.
52. It is a separate question whether the Door, if it is “equipment” was “provided for the purpose of the employer’s business”, which I shall deal with below if necessary, after concluding on whether the Door was “equipment” at all.
53. The House of Lords in Knowles found that a flagstone on which the employee was working was equipment for the purposes of the 1969 Act. Lord Jauncey @ 1433H – 1434E pointed out that the use of the expression “for the purposes of the employer’s business” in the statute meant that it was clearly designed to go beyond a piece of equipment that the employee had to actually use (the type of equipment that was the subject of the Davie case). Lord Jauncey held that it was undoubtedly the case that the flagstone was for use in the employer’s business of repairing roads and pavements which led him to conclude that it was equipment for the purposes of the 1969 Act. That approach seems to acknowledge that the question of whether something is “used in the course of the employer’s business” is not only a qualifying requirement (as per Davidson and as referred to in the previous paragraph), but also one to which the answer helps inform the issue of whether something is “equipment” at all. Both in Knowles and in Bibby (and tangentially in Spencer-Franks, in the sense that the entire oil rig was treated as equipment) the House of Lords observed and acknowledged the direct associations that the relevant item had with the very purpose of the employer’s business i.e. a ship was intrinsically equipment for a ship-owner and the flagstone had undoubtedly been used by the employer for the purposes of repairing roads. It is difficult to say that the Door has this connection with a solicitor’s business in this case.
54. I do not say that this is the test that should be applied to decide whether something should be regarded as equipment (for example, a faulty kettle in an office may well be regarded as “equipment” which also passes the second threshold test of being used in the course of the employer’s business), but this connection to the ultimate activity of the employer’s business, or a lack of it, seems to weigh in the scales of whether something like the Door can truly be regarded as “equipment” for the purposes of the 1969 Act.
55. In Bibby, it was also argued that the word “equipment” derives a more restrictive flavour by virtue of its juxtaposition to the “provided” and should be read as being something provided “to” the employee such as the tool provided to the employee in Davie. Lord Oliver rejected that proposition, stating that there was no reason for reading the word “provided” in anything other than its normal signification of “furnished”. Even with that in mind, it seems to me difficult to describe an ordinary door as equipment provided for the purposes of the Defendant’s business in any sense other than the building is. It is provided to complete a building as habitable and lawful in compliance with regulations. It does not contribute meaningfully to the business of the employer as such.
56. Finally, I must address the point that, if the door is not equipment for the 1969 Act, it leaves someone in the Claimant’s position in the same position as the Claimant in Davie. I accept, of course, that the purpose of the 1969 Act was to provide a remedy to a Claimant in that position. As alluded to above, however, the difficulty here is that any breach of the Workplace Regulations does not amount to a cause of action in itself. I cannot escape from the fact that the 1969 Act used the words that it did. The definition could easily have included reference to parts of buildings or even doors, but it did not. Parliament included separate provision for doors, not in the Equipment Regulations but in the Workplace Regulations.
57. Taking the meaning of the word “equipment” in widest sense, it is in my judgment a step too far to strain the interpretation of the words “equipment used for the purposes of” a solicitor’s business to include an ordinary door in a building.
58. Accordingly, for all of the reasons set out above, and accepting that subs (3) of section 1 of the 1969 Act is meant to be explanatory rather than expansive, but taking its meaning in its broadest sense, I still cannot conclude that the Door or its handle can be regarded as equipment for the purposes of the 1969 Act. It follows that the claim must be dismissed.”