THE CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF PLEADINGS 48: WAS THE TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR A FIGURE HIGHER THAN THE LIMIT SET OUT IN THE CLAIM FORM?

Here we look at a decision on appeal where the appellant defendant complained that damages had been awarded for a higher figure than the limit set out in the claim form.  This is an important procedural question and one that was here determined in the claimants’ favour. (One surprising element of the decision is the observation that it had not been possible to find previous authorities on this issue.  Previous judgments on this matter do exist and are easy to find on this blog…)

“… in the absence of authority I am not prepared to conclude that the Judge simply lacked any power to make an award of the amount he considered appropriate simply because of the statement of value in the Particulars of Claim. CPR 16.3(7) provides that a statement of value in the claim form would not fetter the Judge’s power and I see no principled reason why a similar statement in Particulars of Claim should do so.”

KEY PRACTICE POINTS

It remains sensible for a claimant to plead the correct limit on damages in the claim form and seek to amend the statement of value if it is clear that it may be exceeded.  However as this case shows the statement of value is not definitive.  It is surprising that no previous authority on this issue could be found. There are two cases exactly to point on this blog.  Harrath -v- Stand for Peace Ltd [2017] EWHC 653 (QB), considered here, and Celebrity Speakers Ltd v Daniel & Ors [2023] EWHC 2158 (KB), considered here.  Both of these cases support the view of the judge in this case. One key practice point, therefore, may well be to remember to search this blog…

THE CASE

WLP Trading & Marketing Ltd v Albalous & Anor [2025] EWHC 3357 (Ch), Mr Justice Richards.

THE FACTS

The claimants brought actions in relation to acts of trespass and harassment in relation to his conduct for a period in which they were tenants of properties the defendant held.  During the course of these proceedings the defendant had been subject to a peremptory order and was debarred from defending the action.  Judgment was entered for damages to be assessed.  Each claimant obtained an order for damages in excess of £150,000.

THE DEFENDANT’S UNSUCCESSFUL APPEAL

The appeal was dismissed, except for one minor element in relation to the length of time one of the claimants was allowed meals for eating out.

THE APPEAL IN RELATION TO THE PLEADING AND LIMITATION OF DAMAGES ISSUE

One of the grounds of appeal was that both the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim limited the claim to £100,000.  This was not a point that had been taken below.

WHAT HAPPENED IN A NUTSHELL

This ground of appeal was dismissed.  The rules allow the court to make an award for a higher figure than those set out in the claim form. If the issue had been taken at trial it was highly likely that the claimant would have been given permission to amend.

THE JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE

91. The court awarded each Respondent over £150,000 in damages. Grounds 14 and 15 are effectively a single ground of appeal which assert that the Judge was not entitled to make such an award in circumstances where the Respondents’ Particulars of Claim (dated 3 March 2022) pleaded  a claim for damages in the following terms (with emphasis added):

Damages (General, Special, Aggravated & Exemplary) in excess of £1,000 but less than £100,000.

92. CPR 16.3(2) requires a claimant to specify in the claim form how much it expects to recover by reference to four “bands”. However, CPR 16.3(7) provides expressly that the statement of value in a claim form does not limit the court’s power to give judgment for the amount to which it finds a claimant to be entitled92. . The Appellant does not base these grounds of appeal on CPR 16.3. It notes that the Respondents provided a certificate of value in the claim form to the effect that they expect to recover “up to £25,000”, but accepts that CPR 16.3(7) means that this did not limit the damages that the Judge could award. Its appeal on this ground focuses on the statement in the Appellant’s Particulars of Claim.

93. Neither side referred to any authorities that required the Respondents to quantify their claim for damages in their Particulars of Claim. Nor was I referred to any authorities dealing with the power or otherwise of a court to award damages in excess of a figure specified in Particulars of Claim. Counsel said that they had been unable to find any such authority. 

94. The Particulars of Claim were served just two weeks or so after the Respondents had been wrongfully evicted. The Respondents simply could not have known at that stage what loss they would suffer from the Appellant’s actions not least because they could not have known at that stage how long they would be kept out of occupation. Nor could they have known what exemplary damages should be awarded at that stage since this depended on matters outside their knowledge. The Judge’s role was to reach an evaluative conclusion on the level of damages that should be awarded in the light of matters that were known, and  pleaded  at the time of the trial. I recognise that, in many cases, questions of procedural fairness might well prevent a judge from awarding damages in excess of an amount stated in Particulars of Claim. For example, a defendant may have formulated its defence on an assumption that its exposure to damages was limited and there would be obvious questions of fairness if the “goalposts were moved” during, or indeed after, the trial. However, in the absence of authority I am not prepared to conclude that the Judge simply lacked any power to make an award of the amount he considered appropriate simply because of the statement of value in the Particulars of Claim. CPR 16.3(7) provides that a statement of value in the claim form would not fetter the Judge’s power and I see no principled reason why a similar statement in Particulars of Claim should do so.

95. I therefore approach the matter on the footing that the Judge had power to award the damages that he did, but considerations of procedural fairness could mean that he should not have exercised that power to award more than £100,000 to the Respondents combined. No-one suggests that, in their Particulars of Claim, the Respondents were making any admissions as to the value of their claim which they needed the court’s permission to withdraw under CPR 14.2(11). Rather, I proceed on the basis that, if the point had been identified at the hearing before the Judge, the Respondents would have needed to apply to amend their Particulars of Claim to request damages in a higher amount.

96. The point was not, however, identified at the hearing before the Judge. The Judge cannot be criticised for not spotting the issue himself. In fairness to both the Respondents and the Appellant, neither could have known about the significance of the certificate of value in the Particulars of Claim until the Judge had given judgment on the amount of damages to be awarded. The objection that the Appellant now raises is a new point taken for the first time on appeal. However, I consider it is appropriate to consider it given that it would have been difficult for the Appellant to raise it before the Judge even taking into account the latitude that the Judge gave which I have summarised in paragraph 14.iii) above.

97. In my judgment, if the Appellant had identified the point at the hearing before the Judge, the Respondents would have applied successfully to amend their Particulars of Claim. The points made in paragraph 94 provided good reasons why the Particulars of Claim contained the limited statement of value. The Appellant’s own obfuscation and indeed refusal to give disclosure deprived the Respondents of some of the means necessary to estimate the value of their claim accurately, particularly in relation to exemplary damages. The prejudice to the Appellant of a late amendment such as this would have been minimal since it was subject to the sanction in the Unless Order. There was no suggestion that the Appellant had taken a deliberate decision to fail to comply with disclosure orders because it was facing a claim for less than £100,000 of damages and any such submission would have been unattractive in any event. A further obvious point in favour of allowing a hypothetical amendment application is that it would involve the Respondents seeking a level of damages that the Judge had determined to be appropriate.

98. Of course, it is not possible to express a definitive conclusion on the outcome of an application to amend Particulars of Claim that was never made. However, the fact that, in my judgment, such an application would, on a balance of probabilities, have succeeded provides a firm pointer away from the conclusion that it was somehow unjust for the Judge to make the award of damages he did. The appeal on Grounds 14 and 15 is dismissed.