One Response
Comments are closed.
Subscribe to Blog via Email
Join 16.8K other subscribers
Recent Posts
- COST BITES 342: THE CLAIMANTS’ HYPERBOLIC APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT COST THEM DEARLY: PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR £132,400 FOLLOWING THEIR CHALLENGE OF A BILL OF £147,436.33
- WHEN THE CLAIMANT IS A SOLICITOR’S FIRM AND THE PROGRESS OF THE CLAIM “HINDERED BY A SERIES OF PROCEDURAL BREACHES”: NOT A GREAT START TO THE ASE
- AVOIDING THE PITFALLS: PROCEDURAL DEFAULT, SANCTIONS AND OTHER ISSUES THAT CAUSE ACTIONS TO FAIL: WEBINAR 6th FEBRUARY 2026
- RELIEF FROM SANCTIONS DENIED AFTER A PATTERN OF DEFAULT DELAY AND EXCUSES: TO BREACH ONE UNLESS ORDER MAY BE REGARDED AS MISFORTUNE, TO BREACH TWO LOOKS LIKE …
- COURT SETS ASIDE A DECISION THAT A CLAIMANT HAD BREACHED A PEREMPTORY ORDER: THE ORDER WAS NOT DRAFTED “IN THE CLEAREST AND MOST PRECISE LANGUAGE” NECESSARY
Top Posts
- THE PARTIES SHOULD DRAFT ORDERS IN THE TERMS STATED BY THE JUDGE: THE DRAFTING SHOULD NOT BE LITIGIOUS BUT TRANSACTIONAL
- COST BITES 342: THE CLAIMANTS' HYPERBOLIC APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT COST THEM DEARLY: PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR £132,400 FOLLOWING THEIR CHALLENGE OF A BILL OF £147,436.33
- THE CLAIMANTS FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL OUT OF TIME: COURT REFUSES AN EXTENSION: SOME IMPORTANT LESSONS HERE: OUT OF TIME MEANS OUT OF COURT...
- WITNESS EVIDENCE WEDNESDAY i : COURT WOULD NOT DRAW ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM WITNESSES WHO WERE NOT CALLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE "THE PERMISSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION DO NOT INCLUDE ENABLING THESE DEFENDANTS TO FISH FOR MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF A CASE THAT IS (i) UNPLEADED (ii) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CASE THAT IS PLEADED"
- WITNESS EVIDENCE WEDNESDAY ii: WHY A JUDGE DID NOT ACCEPT THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' WITNESS: SOME REPLIES WERE "ESSENTIALLY MEANINGLESS VERBIAGE DESIGNED TO FOB OFF QUESTIONS" HE "PREFERRED NOT TO ANSWER"
Archives
Blogroll
Books
Useful Links
Copyright
© Gordon Exall, Exall Legal Training, Civil Litigation Brief, 2013-2026.
Unauthorised use and or duplication of the material contained on this blog without permission is strictly prohibited.
Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
It is interesting that there is some tension between the approach to serious allegations set out in paragraph 7(1) here and that of Males J in NA v Nottinghamshire County Council [2014] EWHC 4005 (QB) at [158]:
“Accordingly I find the allegation of sexual abuse against Mr B proved. I should make clear that in considering this allegation, and indeed the allegation of physical abuse against Mrs A, I have applied the civil standard of proof, that is to say the balance of probabilities, but I have done so bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations and have therefore applied the approach described by Lord Nicholls in In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 at 586, as endorsed by the House of Lords in In re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11:
‘The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence. …’”