APPELLANT FILED APPEAL WITH TWO MINUTES TO SPARE: HOWEVER IT WAS FILED IMPROPERLY AND THE APPEAL DISMISSED: THE DANGERS OF HYPERLINKS…

The judgment of Mr Justice Dexter Dias in  Kumar v The General Medical Council (Rev1) [2025] EWHC 820 (Admin) contains an important lesson for all litigants. An appellant left filing a notice of appeal until two minutes before the expiry of the deadline. When the appeal was lodged it was not lodged properly because it required the court to link to hyperlinks.  The appeal was struck out (although there was a detailed consideration of its merits).  The court refused to exercise its discretion to extend time.

“The risk in deciding to attempt to file an appeal until minutes before a 28-day statutory time limit is that you have no time to remedy a defective filing. This is a risk Dr Kumar chose to take.”

KEY PRACTICE POINTS

This case highlights the dangers of leaving filing until the last minute.  In any event when documents are filed at court practitioners must ensure that they are lodged in accordance with the rules. Here it is clear that hyperlinks to documents are not permitted and does not constitute compliance with the rules.

THE CASE

The appellant doctor brought an appeal against a decision of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal.   Such an appeal can be brought as of right, however there is a time limit of 28 days.

THE APPELLANT’S APPEAL

The appellant attempted to lodge the appeal some two minutes before the expiry of the deadline.  Rather than attaching documents to the email the appellant provided a link to the documents at an external site.

THE COURT’S FINDING THAT THE APPEAL WAS LODGED OUT OF TIME

The judge held that the appeal was not lodged in time.   The rules do not permit such an appeal to be lodged by the court being required to link to an external site.  Further there was no good reason for the court to exercise its discretion in the appellant’s favour.  He had left things to the very last minute (quite literally) and was the author of his own misfortune.

69. The respondent applied to strike out the appeal. The court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of MPT decisions brought within the statutory time limit, but not if the strict time limit is not complied with unless the court exceptionally grants an extension in its discretion. The appellant’s notice must be filed within 28 days of notification of the decision under challenge. There must be compliance with rules under the CPR (Gupta v GMC [2020] EWHC 38 (Admin) at para 57).

70. The basis of the GMC’s application is that the appeal was not lodged in time and the court should not exercise its narrow discretion to grant an extension.

71. There are two questions (1) whether the appellant filed his appeal in time (2) if not, whether the court in its discretion should extend time.

72. The facts can be simply stated. The parties proceeded in the argument on the basis that the deadline was midnight on 12 June 2024. At 23:58 hours on that day, Dr Kumar emailed the Administrative Court general office email. He claims in the email that he “attached” his appeal. It is clear that at the bottom of his email there is writing stating “High_Court_Appeal_Bundle.pdf”. Dr Kumar submits that this complies with the filing requirements.

73. It does not. This is a link to Google drive. Therefore, the requisite appeal documentation was not attached as is required under PD 5B, paras 2.1 and 3.2:

“2.1 Subject to paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3, a party may e-mail the court and may attach or include one or more specified documents to or in that e-mail.

3.2 Subject to paragraph 3.3, correspondence and documents may be sent as either text in the body of the e-mail, or as one or more attachments.”

74. Instead, the court administration was invited to click a link to an external website through a hyperlink. This court has found that appeal notice filing by hyperlink is impermissible (per Lavender J in R (ETM Contractors Limited) v Bristol City Council [2024] EWHC 2263 (Admin)). This is due to the obvious data security and system integrity issues that hyperlinks may produce.

75. The appellant claims that a hyperlink that will click through to a PDF is equivalent to an attachment. It plainly is not. Therefore, on the first question, I have little difficulty in determining that the appeal was not lodged in a valid format in time. On that Mr Davidson is correct. I turn to the second question.

76. The discretion conferred on the court to grant extensions is narrow. The statutory time limit may only be extended in exceptional circumstances. The fault here – and it is a fault clearly attributable to the appellant – was leaving it until a few minutes before the midnight deadline. I agree with Mr Davidson that this brings the case very close to what was said in the seminal and often-cited case of R (Adesina) v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818. The Court of Appeal considered an appeal against the first instance decision of Hickinbottom J (as he then was) who held that the appeal was time-barred. Maurice Kay LJ said at para 16:

“Mr Pascall may have won the legal battle but he does not come within a country mile of winning the forensic war. On the now undisputed facts, these two appellants simply left it too late. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, the adverse decisions were in the presence of each appellant. They had immediate knowledge of the result. In Mrs Adesina’s case, time began to run on the day after the day on which her decision letter was posted by first-class post, 30 January 2012. Time therefore began to run on 31 January. Although her factual case was that the letter had not been posted until 9 February and she produced an envelope bearing such a date stamp, the judge found that that envelope had contained a different letter on a different matter. She had not instructed solicitors at the time but she sought the advice of a barrister to whom, on request, a copy of the decision was sent on 2 February. Her notice of appeal was not lodged until 9 March. It is utterly impossible to see her case as exceptional or her delay as blameless.” (emphasis provided)

77. What might constitute exceptional circumstances was reviewed in Gupta at para 47:

“In these decisions a wide range of circumstances were rejected by the Court as amounting to exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time to comply with Article 6. These include (a) difficulties in obtaining legal advice or legal aid (Adesina; Kabba); (b) inability to raise funds to pay the court fee in time (Daniels); (c) a degree of ill health or stress (Pinto); (d) where the delay in question was very short, ie, one or two days after the deadline (Adesina; Adegbulugbe; Parkin; Darfoor).”

78. On 18 June 2024, the ACO DUC sent Dr Kumar links to an online folder for him to upload documents. According to an email, the appellant tried uploading two documents on 18 June 2024. In response to a GMC query email about the documentation, Dr Kumar replied on 2 August 2024, “Please find enclosed the proof of uploading the document on 18 June 2024.” On 7 August 2024, the Administrative Office emailed Dr Kumar saying, “Thank you for your application via the DUC. It has now been issued (attached with the receipt letter).”

79. Here, therefore, the delay is at a minimum six days. His case is that he did file his appeal in time. He did not. He alternatively submits that he “genuinely believed he filed the appeal in time”. That is not the test. Dr Kumar relies on the judgment of Sheldon J in Pandian v General Medical Council [2024] EWHC 629 (Admin) at paras 27-28. However, this does not assist him. That case involved the registrant being advised of the “wrong” deadline by the tribunal. Here I have considered the question of time limits on the basis that midnight on 12 June 2024 is the operative deadline. The risk in deciding to attempt to file an appeal until minutes before a 28-day statutory time limit is that you have no time to remedy a defective filing. This is a risk Dr Kumar chose to take.

80. Julian Knowles J put the question for the court in this way in Gupta at para 57:

“I turn to the question whether this case is one of those rare and exceptional cases in which it would be proper to extend the time limit.”

81. One focuses on the justification for the delay rather than the substantive merits of the grounds of appeal. Using that measure, there is nothing rare or exceptional in Dr Kumar’s case. His delay here is culpable. Accordingly, I refuse to exercise my discretion to extend time. That determines question 2.

82. The consequence of my decisions on questions 1 and 2 is that the respondent’s application succeeds. This deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal as it is time-barred. The appeal must be struck out. I emphasise, however, that I have carefully considered the substantive merits of the grounds advanced and have independently dismissed each of them.