COST BITES 183: A SERIES OF BILLS WERE NOT STATUTE BILLS: “CHAMBERLAIN” NOT ENGAGED: THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE FOUND “SPECIAL REASONS” TO ALLOW ASSESSMENT IN ANY EVENT

In Guest Supplies Intl Ltd v Spector Constant & Williams Limited [2024] EWHC 2450 (SCCO)  Costs Judge Nagalingam decided that a series of bills sent by a solicitor were not statutory bills, neither were they “Chamberlain bills”.  In any event the judge would have exercised his discretion to allow assessment to go ahead in any event.

“The language of this section is not sufficiently explicit such that I consider the Claimant could have expected to have received interim statute bills such that they would be considered final for the period covered, and that the statutory time limits to challenge the same would run from the date of delivery.”

THE CASE

The claimants had engaged the defendant solicitors to act on their behalf in litigation. The parties worked under the terms of a CFA.   The defendant rendered a number of bills.  The claimant wished to challenge those bills. An issue arose as to whether the claimant was able to challenge the bills given the time for challenge had passed, the bills having been paid in full.  The claimant’s response was that the defendant’s bills were not statute bills nor were they Chamberlain bills.

(A QUICK NOTE ABOUT CHAMBERLAIN BILLS)

The term “Chamberlain bill” arises from the case of Chamberlain v Boodle and King [1982] 3 All ER 188.  The solicitor submitted regular interim invoices throughout the case which were not final statute bills.  They then invoiced one final bill.  The series of bills were regarded as one bill allowing for one complete case, divided into parts.  As we shall see whether a series of bills is a “Chamberlain” bill is an issue of fact.

THE DECISION IN THIS CASE: THESE WERE NOT FINAL BILLS

The judge considered the terms of the retainer in detail and concluded that these were not final bills.

“Client care letter, terms and conditions, and the CFA.

1. 1. The first issue which falls to be considered is the relationship between the retainer and the status of the bills, to include the effect of any payments, and ultimately the resultant impact on whether a right to seek an assessment arises.

1. 1. The client care letter is dated 19 October 2020, and encloses a separate terms and conditions document.

1. 1. Under the charges and expenses section of the client care letter, confirmation is given of the Defendant’s unwillingness to enter into a no win, no fee agreement. Instead a discounted CFA is referenced, also dated 19 October 2020.

1. 1. This section also references a cap of £117,000 plus VAT “in line with the Approved Claimant’s Costs Budget dated 18 May 2020” and said to be “limited to the steps set out in the Costs Budget after the CMC”.

1. 1. The client care letter goes on to confirm that “..if we are required to or instructed to carry out additional steps that falls outside of the above mentioned Costs Budget, this work will not form part of the cap and there will be additional charges in respect of it. You are sending to us a number of emails and contemporaneous documents that we have not previously seen. We will need to review these and this work falls outside our cap as it is not envisaged in the cost budget”.

1. 1. In relation to “bills”, the client care letter records:

“The bills we raise in this matter must be paid promptly and in accordance with our terms and conditions enclosed. If our fees are not paid in full as stipulated, we reserve the right to immediately cease working on the matter”.

1. 1. Thus save for any intervening effect from the terms and conditions or CFA, the client care letter alone does not create a clear agreement for the raising of interim statute bills.

1. 1. Under the section “Undertakings”, there is reference to the making of payments out from funds received. However, this section in isolation does not address the issue of consent to make deductions. It simply alludes to the fact that work cannot be commenced, or will not be continued, until cleared funds are in the Defendant’s account.

1. 1. With regards to estimates, the client care letter simply states “Please refer to the CFA and Costs Budget”.

1. 1. Given that the basis of the capped costs was the Claimant’s budget which was already set in stone before the Defendant was instructed, one would expect the CFA to address the estimates of work outside of the cap. It is not clear how reference to the costs budget would inform the Claimant as to the amount of fees that might be incurred outside of the agreed cap.

1. 1. The section marked “Raising Queries” does not mention costs or fees, and is rather focused on raising issues with the quality of service.

1. 1. I now turn to the accompanying terms and conditions document. This is a single page document, albeit in a small font, setting out 17 distinct clauses and signed by both parties on 19 November 2020.

1. 1. Clause 3.5, under the fees section, states:

“We reserve the right to seek payment on account of fees and disbursements where considered appropriate. If a payment on account is not made when requested we reserve the right to suspend any further work until payment is made or at our discretion to determine our retainer with you.”

1. 1. That language is consistent with the retainer letter, with regards to the consequences of not making payments upon request.

1. 1. The “DELIVERY OF BILLS CLAUSE” is worth setting out in full. It provides:

“4.1 We reserve the right to deliver bills to you from time to time at appropriate stages of a matter, or at regular intervals (“interim bills”) for work carried out on your behalf.

4.2 If an interim bill has been delivered which is unpaid after 30 days we reserve the right to decline to act any further until paid and if not paid within two months then we reserve the right to determine our retainer with you in which matter you will remain liable to pay the full amount of work done to that date.

4.3 If we hold sufficient sums on your behalf when we have sent you our bill, you authorise us to deduct our charges from those funds.

4.4 Accounts are to be settled on presentation.

4.5 You agree that if you do not pay any or part of our fees we are entitled to secure those monies by way of a charge under section 73 of the solicitors act 1974.”

1. 1. The language of this section is not sufficiently explicit such that I consider the Claimant could have expected to have received interim statute bills such that they would be considered final for the period covered, and that the statutory time limits to challenge the same would run from the date of delivery.

1. 1. There is no additional explanation as to what is meant by “appropriate stages of a matter” and no agreement in the client care letter to raise bills at “regular intervals”, such as monthly for example.

1. 1. Clause 4.2 is consistent with clause 3.5 and the retainer letter, in that a failure to keep up to date with payments will likely result in work being paused or otherwise terminated.

1. 1. Clause 4.3 is clearly of some importance, given the parties’ differing positions as to the impact on the payments taken. However, because the status of the “bill” referred to in clause 4.3 is unclear, I do not consider any such deductions made can be deemed in satisfaction of an interim statute bill where thus far no right to raise such interim statute bills has been demonstrated by the Defendant.

1. 1. Thereafter, the terminology of settling ‘accounts’ does not assist where ‘account’ is not defined elsewhere. At best, it can be taken to mean when an actual bill is raised then the expectation is it will be paid without delay.

1. 1. Clause 4.5 is concerned with how any monies owed will be recovered, as opposed to any right to raise interim statute bills.

1. 1. Clause 7 deals with the settlement of bills by instalments. It therefore suggests circumstances whereby following completion of a matter, the Defendant retains a discretion to have their bills settled by instalments. Whilst I am not aware of the Claimant placing any reliance in clause 7, it strikes me the inclusion of such a clause at the very least infers some form of “reckoning up” and the issuance of a final bill when a matter is completed.

1. 1. Clause 9 covers “ASSESSMENTS” and briefly addresses either using a complaints procedure or applying to the court for an assessment. However, that assumes the bill in question has the status of a statute bill, and in circumstances where I have thus far seen nothing to demonstrate an agreement for the raising of interim statute bills one must assume clause 9 refers to a final statute bill.

1. 1. I now turn to the CFA document dated 19 October 2020. Throughout my consideration of the client care letter and terms & conditions, I have also considered the “INTERPRETATION” section of the CFA. Nothing in the same assists the Defendant in terms of whether there was an agreement to raise interim statute bills.

1. 1. The CFA does define the distinction between the discounted rates and the normal rates, and the circumstances in which one or the other might be payable.

1. 1. Clause 4.3 of the CFA demonstrates some consistency with clause 4.1 of the terms & conditions, in that it states an intention to “bill the Client” on a monthly basis, i.e. at regular intervals. It proceeds to explain that such bills will be based on the discounted rates.

1. 1. Clause 5.1 of the CFA then explains that if the Claimant wins their claim, they will be liable for the Defendant’s fees at the normal rates.

1. 1. This demonstrates that by definition, bills issued using the discounted rates could not be considered final for the period they covered until the outcome of the litigation was known and if the “win” clause of the CFA was triggered, or not as the case may be.

1. 1. Clause 7 addresses the success fee, and the circumstances under which that additional sum also becomes payable. None of the bills delivered to the Claimant during the life of the action included any sum calculated for a success fee. Indeed it couldn’t, unless and until the win clause had been activated given the success fee was to be calculated on the normal rates, not the discounted rates.

1. 1. Clause 11 of the CFA addresses the Claimant’s right to apply for an assessment, and sets out:

“The Client has the right to an assessment by the court of the amount of the fees, Success fee and/or disbursements which are payable by the Client under this agreement, by making an application under section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974. But there are time limits for that application, including an absolute right to an assessment if the Client applies to the court within one month of delivery to the Client of the bill of costs, and a gradual reduction of the right the longer it is left thereafter, which SCW will inform the Client about if asked. The Client is of course welcome to seek advice from another law firm about this but would have to pay for that.”

1. 1. This clause is informative, but does not create a right to raise interim statute bills. Indeed, the reference to the delivery of “the bill of costs” in the singular might otherwise infer the delivery of a single bill at the end. In reality, a “bill of costs” is something that is produced for a detailed assessment. It is arguably distinct from a statute bill. As such, it is also possible this clause could cause confusion.

1. 1. In my view, there is nothing in the client care letter, terms and conditions, or the CFA, whether read in isolation or collectively, that demonstrates an agreement to raise interim statute bills, whether explicitly or impliedly.

1. 1. If anything, the text of these documents, in my view, all point to the raising of requests for payments on account in anticipation of the raising of a single final bill at the end.”

THESE WERE NOT CHAMBERLAIN BILLS

The defendant’s secondary arguments was that these were Chamberlain bills.  The judge did not accept this.

“Payments

1. 1. Having drawn that conclusion, the Defendant’s fallback position is that the effect of their actions has been to raise a Chamberlain bill, which by 7 June 2021 was deemed paid in full as far as the Defendant is concerned.

1. 1. That means that had the Claimant brought their claim by 7 July 2021 then they would have had an absolute right to a detailed assessment (on the Defendant’s case and in light of my finding above). However, because the claim was not brought until September 2021, and the Defendant says their bills have been paid in full, the Defendant argues special circumstances still need to be demonstrated by the Claimant.

1. 1. The only sections of the funding documents that address payment by deduction are clause 4.3 of the terms and conditions document (which I have set out above), and clause 5.4 of the CFA.

1. 1. The clause 4.3 authority to make such a deduction only applies to bills.

1. 1. Within clause 4.3, there is no reference to interim statute bills, and the retainer documents collectively fail to adequately address what was intended to be meant by “bill” for the purpose of the agreement. In my view, the Claimant was therefore entitled to take the reference to “bill” to mean the final bill raised at the end of the matter.

1. 1. Clause 5.4 of the CFA refers to how monies an opponent is ordered to pay or agrees to pay is used. That is the Defendant will receive all such monies, “take any fees and Disbursements due to it and pay the balance to the Client”.

1. 1. Whilst I appreciate that this clause may apply to the consequences of interim applications, it falls under the section “WHAT HAPPENS IF THE CLIENT WINS”, and the definition of “win” in the CFA is that the claim is “finally” decided in the client’s favour. As such, I can very well see why a lay client would interpret clause 5.4 of the CFA as applying to the deduction of monies held in satisfaction of a final bill raised at the end of a matter.

1. 1. I take heed of paragraphs 41 and 42 of Menzies, which are quoted above. The issue of prior authority to make deductions in specified circumstances matters little if the circumstances envisaged do not arise. In this case, and to quote from Menzies, “In order for a transfer of money to be in satisfaction of a bill, there must be a bill to be satisfied”.

1. 1. As such, even if a Chamberlain bill is established, the relevant applicable sections of the Solicitors Act vary in their requirements (absolute right, discretionary right, or special circumstances) based on whether payment is deemed made or not.

1. 1. Accordingly, the status of the bills delivered needs to be considered.

Status of the bills

1. 1. In terms of the bills delivered to the Claimant, the claim form sets out 7 bills with a net total sum of £236,811.18 inclusive of VAT. In order to draw comparison with the capped amount, the figure exclusive of VAT and calculated success fee claim of £38,306.40 is £159,035.85. That is to be contrasted with a capped figure of £117,000 plus VAT.

1. 1. The bills are dated 29 October 2020, 26 November 2020, 23 December 2020, 28 January 2021, 25 February 2021, 30 March 2021, and 28 April 2021.

1. 1. Each bill follows an identical format and in terms of a bill narrative, simply states the period covered and “Our Professional Fees in relation to Dispute with South Place Hotel and D&D Lnd Ltd”.

1. 1. The word “bill” does not appear on any of the documents described above. They are all referred to as invoices, with the only difference being the invoice date, invoice number, period covered and additional information where relevant.

1. 1. The 29/10/20 invoice covers the period 29/09/20 to 29/10/20. The 26/11/20 invoice covers the period 30/10/20 to 26/11/20. The 23/12/20 invoice covers the period 27/11/2020 to 23/12/20. Thus taken as a group of three invoices, they present as being final and complete for the periods they purport to cover.

1. 1. However, the 28/01/21 invoice also purports to cover work on 23/12/20 and up to 28/01/20. This is the first example of two invoices which cover work done on the same date, which suggests the earlier invoice cannot have been complete for the period it was intended to cover.

1. 1. The 25/02/21 invoice covers the period 29/01/21 to 25/02/21. However, the 30/03/21 invoice is stated to also cover work from 23/02/21 and up to 30/03/21, albeit this invoice is marked as being in reference to the success fee. This is the second example of an invoice including a date range for work covered by an earlier invoice. It is also unclear why, if the 30/03/21 invoice was intended to relate to a success fee only, is it limited to a date range that excludes work undertaken before 23/02/21.

1. 1. The final invoice is 28/04/21 which is said to cover the period from 25/02/21 to 28/04/21. This is therefore the third example of an invoice which also covers dates which appear in at least one earlier invoice.

1. 1. There are thus at least 3 examples of invoices in which there is a crossover of dates covered by the same. At the time, none of these invoices were accompanied by a time ledger such that it could be established if any work was done on the dates which appeared in more than one invoice.

1. 1. The “NOTICE TO CLIENTS” on the reverse of each invoice does not refer to bills, let alone statute bills. It outlines the options to raise a complaint or refer to the Legal Ombudsman. It also refers to “the right to have our charges reviewed by a court, under Part III of the Solicitors Act 1974”, followed by some information about time limits. The notice erroneously informs clients that the right to an assessment is lost after one year from delivery, because that is only correct if the status of the invoice is that of a statute bill, and the bill has been paid.

1. 1. Notwithstanding the fact I have already concluded that no contractual right to raise interim statute bills arises in this matter, I am satisfied that what the Defendant delivered does not qualify as an interim statute bill in any event.

1. 1. The Defendant’s table demonstrating the dates on which bills were delivered (and later breakdowns delivered) only serves to underline the inadequacy of, or arguably absence of, a narrative to the bills sent. It demonstrates an implicit acceptance on the part of the Defendant that what they delivered were not compliant statute bills, and the provision of a breakdown weeks or months later, and only upon request, was an effort to repair the damage.

1. 1. Thus not only are none of the bills stated to be as such, but none of the bills include a sufficient narrative, as per Garry.

1. 1. Further, the bills which purport to cross over on certain dates could not be taken to be final for the period covered. That is in addition to the fact that by virtue of being invoiced at discounted rates pending the outcome of the underlying litigation / activation of the CFA win clause, the invoices/bills could not be finalised anyway.

1. 1. As to the later production of a time ledger or spreadsheets, I do not accept that a compliant statute bill can be produced on a piecemeal basis. For example, the provision of a breakdown on 6 January 2021 relating to invoices delivered on or around 29/10/20, 26/11/20 and 23/12/20 is not sufficient.

Chamberlain bill and payment

1. 1. One key component of the claim form is that whilst the 7 invoices delivered total £236,811.18, the Claimant says they have only made payments amounting to £216,989.60. Thus even if a Chamberlain bill is established such that the 28 April 2021 is considered the final bill in the chain, there would still be a shortfall of £19,821.58.

1. 1. It may be that I recorded the figure provided by Mr Benson incorrectly, but clearly the transfer of a sum of £19,941.58 from the client account to the office account would have cleared the shortfall referred to above.

1. 1. As such, if a Chamberlain bill is established then the Defendant argues it would be deemed paid such that the Claimant would need to demonstrate special circumstances. That is because the claim form would be deemed served some 3 and half months after the bill was paid off in full.

1. 1. It is noted that the Defendant is critical of an apparent “volte face” by the Claimant with respect to their stance as to whether a Chamberlain bill arises. With respect, that is either a decision for the court, or for the parties to agree on either an unconditional basis or with consequences consented to by the parties.

1. 1. Whilst the Claimant may well have at one stage been receptive to agreeing to treat the invoices delivered as a chain of bills such that a Chamberlain bill was created, they understandably were not so receptive where the Defendant’s stance was to say that meant the Claimant needed to establish special circumstances.

1. 1. I also note that at paragraph 3 of Mr Spector’s witness statement dated 11 October 2021, he expressed the view “Although I consider that special circumstances could not be shown I do not have any particular problem with the bills being assessed and so, if the Claimant wishes to have an assessment I do not object. I hope therefore this dispenses with any satellite dispute about special circumstances or the need to deliver any further bills/cash account”.

1. 1. Only the parties know how close they came to achieving a sensible compromise but I record this court has already been put on notice that both parties have points they wish to raise at a later date about the costs of this part of the costs only proceedings.

1. 1. In the index matter, no natural breaks have been identified such that different portions of work could be treated as being charged and assessed separately. In the event, the Defendant delivered invoices on a monthly basis.

1. 1. In Bari v Rosen [2012] EWHC 1782 (QB) the court determined that invoices which were not interim statute bills because of a lack of contractual entitlement could in any event still amount to a Chamberlain bill. This conclusion is supported by Sprey v Rawlinson Butler [2018] EWHC 354.

1. 1. However, each case must be taken on its own facts.

1. 1. In this regard, I agree with Mr Benson that the cited example of Costs Judge Rowley’s unreported decision in Charles Russell Speechlys v Pieres should not be looked at as a ‘solicitor-friendly’ decision but rather on its own terms. In that case, it was held that three of the six invoices delivered contained insufficient narratives to qualify as statute bills, but that collectively the invoices amounted to a Chamberlain bill because the final invoice raised was compliant with the statutory requirements of the Solicitors Act.

1. 1. Similarly, one does not read the decision of Senior Costs Judge Gordon-Saker in Rahimian v Allan Jones (also unreported) and conclude it to be a ‘client-friendly’ decision. In that case, the majority of invoices raised contained no description of the work done such that between September 2011 and February 2014 there was no narrative, but narratives were provided from February to July 2014. The judge concluded that the absence a sufficient narrative, looking at the chain as a whole, meant that no statute bill could be constructed from the chain.

1. 1. I agree with Mr Griffiths’ general observation that the case law, when looked as a whole, and appreciating only limited references are made above, does not combine to set out a defined criteria that must be met in order for a Chamberlain bill to arise.

1. 1. I also agree with Mr Benson where, in citing Richard Slade v Erlam [2022} EWHC 325 (QB), he submits I ought to be cautious in deciding whether a Chamberlain bill arises based on the consequences of that decision. The net effect of the circumstances either gives rise to a Chamberlain bill or it doesn’t. The consequences for the parties are then just the natural product of that decision. In that respect, I disagree with Mr Griffiths that the consequences for the Claimant “should weigh heavily in the balance” were I to decide that a Chamberlain bill arises.

1. 1. Taking all of the relevant factors into account, my conclusion is that a Chamberlain bill has not been established in this matter.

1. 1. The absence of a contractual right to raise interim statute bills is not fatal to the Defendant here.

1. 1. However, the fact that none of the invoices contained a sufficient narrative, and my rejection that the information necessary for a statute bill can be provided on a piecemeal basis, and the fact that 5 of the 7 invoices contain dates which cross over such that at least 3 of the invoices cannot be deemed final and complete for the periods they are deemed to cover, all lead me to conclude that no statute bill has been delivered.”

WOULD THE COURT HAVE FOUND “SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES”?

The judge went on to consider whether they would have exercised their discretion to allow assessment if these had been statute or Chamberlain bills.  The found that they would have exercised their discretion so as to allow the bills to be subject to assessment.

“Discretion or special circumstances

1. 1. I am acutely aware of proportionality in these assessment proceedings and, had I concluded that a Chamberlain bill arose in the circumstances of this case, I do not consider a further hearing would have been required as to whether special circumstances arise.

1. 1. In so far in that may be of assistance, I comment below as to how I would have ruled had I concluded that a Chamberlain bill arose.

1. 1. At the outset, I reiterate my acceptance of Mr Benson’s observations that the Claimant cannot point to any authoritative finding that the exercise of the court’s discretion to construct and conclude a Chamberlain bill should not by default deprive a former client of the right to challenge a bill.

1. 1. On the facts of the index matter, Mr Benson is also correct to point out that the Claimant would not have been deprived of the right to seek an assessment. Rather they would have been required to demonstrate special circumstances.

1. 1. However, in my view, and as is so often the case, special circumstances are unique to the facts of a particular case.

1. 1. In this matter there are a number of factors which combine to lead me to the conclusion that even if a Chamberlain bill were established, special circumstances do arise, such that I would have ordered an assessment.

1. 1. Firstly, the fact that the retainer was based on a cap which was linked to or based on an existing budget set whilst the Claimant was with another firm of solicitors requires some scrutiny of what was intended to be included and excluded from the cap.

1. 1. With regard to the spreadsheet produced, the high point of the Defendant’s argument is that essentially the provision of a colour coded table removed all uncertainty as to what costs were inside and outside the cap.

1. 1. The spreadsheet is of some relevance, because it is a contemporaneously produced document made in light of queries at the time, and not long after the event. However, the spreadsheet itself is in fact the time ledger which was produced in any event. All the Defendant has done is go through that document and colour coded it, for the following categories:

1) Emails, documents or mixed categories

2) WS of James Dempsey

3) Witness Summonses

4) C’s Application dated 26.11.2020

5) Order & Judgment dated Dec 2010

6) C’s and D’s SD applications

1. 1. One must then consider the extent to which the lay Claimant would understand these category descriptions and the extent to which the Claimant could reasonably have definitively concluded whether the work done fell inside or outside the cap based on the time ledger alone.

1. 1. The Defendant’s argument that the Claimant could have asked to inspect the Defendant’s files is all very well, but that requires the lay Claimant to step into the mind of the person who created the spreadsheet and colour coded it.

1. 1. It was the Defendant who created the retainer with a cap. The lay client Claimant then signed up to it. Is it unreasonable for Claimant to then ask for the presentation of a bill/s which makes it clear which fees are inside and outside the cap? For example, if the ‘inside the cap’ fees were £150,000 plus VAT, the natural reading of the retainer is that such work would be subject to the cap, and a charge not exceeding £117,000 plus VAT would follow. If the ‘outside the cap’ fees were say £75,000, one would not be unreasonable in seeking a clear demonstration that fees within the cap have not been erroneously charged outside of the cap.

1. 1. For example, with regard to the witness statement of Mr Dempsey, if the Defendant cannot unambiguously demonstrate that such work falls exclusively outside of the cap, then how is the lay client Claimant supposed to arrive at a definitive conclusion without seeking further or better information, potentially in the form of a breakdown of costs.

1. 1. By way of further example, the Defendant’s explanation in relation to “Witness Summonses”, which are said to have caused £4,791 of costs to be incurred outside of the cap, lacks clarity. The response indicates that the Defendant factored in the cost of witness summonses within the cap, but then decided that all summonses above a certain number (which as far as I am aware has not been communicated to the Claimant) would be chargeable outside of the cap. One has sympathy with a Claimant who faced with those circumstances might wish to have more information.

1. 1. Secondly, the budget in question was to the conclusion of a trial but the underlying dispute was resolved several phases earlier than the trial phase, yet the full amount of the cap is claimed. That also requires some scrutiny.

1. 1. Thirdly, the Defendant places great faith in their colour coded schedules. However, the original schedule was not created for these costs only proceedings. It is a spreadsheet of work done, which has later been colour coded in a belated attempt to explain what work was inside and outside of the cap.

1. 1. The Claimant ought to be afforded the opportunity to interrogate how the work has been coded and consider if such work properly falls outside of the cap.

1. 1. Fourthly, I agree with the Claimant that there are numerous examples of where the belated disclosure of the descriptions of work done do not assist in identifying if that work properly appears outside of the cap or not.

1. 1. Finally, it is not at all clear on what basis, or under what control mechanism, costs outside of the cap were being incurred. The Claimant’s evidence is that their expectation was such costs would be minimal and indeed in early discussions the Defendant gave this impression too. However, over a series of phone calls, e-mails and WhatsApp messages, the Defendant communicated a rapid escalation in the ‘out of cap’ costs, with apparently no or little adequate explanation as to why, and in my view leaving a question mark over the extent to which authority was given for that rapid increase in fees.

1. 1. Thus whether I was exercising my discretion under section 70(3)(a), (b) or (c), I would have concluded that I either ought to exercise my discretion and order assessment, or conclude that special circumstances have been established such that an assessment should be permitted to continue.

1. 1. In the event, both those conclusions are redundant because I find that there was no right to raise interim statute bills, that what were delivered did not amount to interim statute bills, and that the invoices delivered do not amount to a series of bills forming a Chamberlain bill such that the Claimant could rely on the final invoice as representing a final bill.

1. 1. Accordingly, an order will follow which permits for delivery up of a final statute bill, delivery up of a cash account, and costs reserved in relation to the costs of the Claimant’s application so that they may be dealt with at the same time as addressing the costs of the 20 June 2023 hearing.

1. No order for assessment is necessary at this stage because no statute bill has been served yet, and pursuant to section 70(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974, the Claimant is automatically entitled to an order that the bill be assessed if they make a new application before the expiration of one month from the delivery of that bill.”