ANOTHER (YES ANOTHER) CASE OF FAKE AUTHORITIES BEING CITED TO THE COURT: APPEAL STRUCK OUT AS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS

Unbelievably we are looking at another case where the court found that false authorities had been cited to it.  The appeal was struck out as an abuse of process.

“In my judgment, the Court needs to take decisive action to protect the integrity of its processes against any citation of fake authority. There have been multiple examples of fake authorities cited by the Appellant to the Court, in these proceedings. They are non-existent cases. Here, moreover, they have been put forward by someone who was previously a practising solicitor. The citations were included, and maintained, in formal documents before the Court. They were never withdrawn. They were never explained. That, notwithstanding that they were pointed out by the SRA, well ahead of this hearing. This, in my judgment, constitutes a set of circumstances in which I should exercise – and so I will exercise – the power of the Court to strike out the grounds of appeal in this case as an abuse of process.”

THE CASE

Bandla v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2025] EWHC 1167 (Admin), Fordham J.

The appellant was seeking permission to appeal out of time, and to appeal,  a decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal to strike him off the roll of solicitors. The judge refused the application to extend time.  He went on the consider an issue relating to the authorities that the appellant had cited in support of the application and appeal.  The judge found, and to some extent the appellant is reported as accepting, some of the cases cited did not exist.

THE JUDGMENT ON THIS ISSUE

50. The final topic is one I foreshadowed when referring to Case-Law near the start of this judgment. It relates to the citation of authority to the Court. I have described the many documents put before the Court by the Appellant, in support of his application for an extension of time and his appeal. He has even provided a witness statement which describes the “utility” of “cited cases” as “illuminating the manner in which legal principles have been applied by courts”, and as “serving as persuasive tools”. He describes himself as endeavouring to identify and present cases bearing the closest resemblance to this appeal. A large number of cases are cited in his documents.

51. Within the SRA’s skeleton argument (dated 6 May 2025), and addressed in detail in an Annex to that skeleton argument, there is a description of the inability of the SRA and its solicitors in locating cases that have been cited in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and also in his own skeleton argument (21 April 2025). During his oral submissions the Appellant told me that he had written a synopsis of a judgment in a case which he was citing; and that he had done so having read the judgment himself. I put to him, as an illustration, the first of the many supposed cases which he had cited, but which the SRA having undertaken legal research say does not exist. This is just the first of some 27 such authorities listed in the SRA’s Annex. In fairness to the Appellant, I ought to record that two of the 27 are, I think, wrongly criticised. What the Appellant called Osborne was Osborn and was [2013] UKSC 61. Ghosh in 2000 was a Privy Council case; not as the Appellant cited it a House of Lords case. I return to the first of many examples of a non-existent case, being cited in support of this appeal. This is from the Grounds of Appeal:

52. R (on the application of Smith) v Parole Board [2005] EWCA Civ 188. This case involved an appellant who suffered from a mental disorder and sought to challenge a decision made by the Parole Board out of time. The Court of Appeal ruled that tribunals and courts must consider the mental health of the appellant and how it impaired their ability to act within time . The court emphasized that justice requires a flexible approach, especially when mental illness is a factor.
The SRA’s Annex records that the SRA was unable to locate this case; that the citation was incorrect and was for a case with different parties; that cases with this name do exist; but that they do not appear to stand for the proposition given. (I interpose that I have myself looked at [2003] EWCA Civ 1269 and at [2005] UKHL 1.) The Appellant’s response was as follows. He told me that he did not write this summary himself. He told me he had not read this judgment himself. He denied using AI or any source identifiable as AI. He claimed to have simply used a Google search for “case law in support of mental health problems”. He accepts that this case, and many other cases which he cited to this Court, do not in fact exist. He told me that he never “double-verified” them. He later accepted that he never checked them at all.

53. I asked the Appellant why, in the light of this citation of non-existent authorities, the Court should not of its own motion strike out the grounds of appeal in this case, as being an abuse of the process of the Court. His answer was as follows. He claimed that the substance of the points which were being put forward in the grounds of appeal were sound, even if the authority which was being cited for those points did not exist. He was saying, on that basis, that the citation of non-existent (fake) authorities would not be a sufficient basis to concern the Court, at least to the extent of taking that course. I was wholly unpersuaded by that answer. In my judgment, the Court needs to take decisive action to protect the integrity of its processes against any citation of fake authority. There have been multiple examples of fake authorities cited by the Appellant to the Court, in these proceedings. They are non-existent cases. Here, moreover, they have been put forward by someone who was previously a practising solicitor. The citations were included, and maintained, in formal documents before the Court. They were never withdrawn. They were never explained. That, notwithstanding that they were pointed out by the SRA, well ahead of this hearing. This, in my judgment, constitutes a set of circumstances in which I should exercise – and so I will exercise – the power of the Court to strike out the grounds of appeal in this case as an abuse of process.